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THE POLITICAL GRAMMAR OF EARLY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
H. JEFFERSON POWELL*
In this Article, Professor H. Jefferson Powell discusses the
United States Constitution and the historical era during which it
was written and adopted. He analyzes the Constitution not as a
set of rules creating and organizing the federal government, but
as a document that inspired political debate and the culture out
of which our notions and understandings of constitutionalism
grew. Professor Powell asserts that the "creation of a shared
political and legal language" is perhaps one of the greatest
achievements offounding-era Americans. Because deep political
disagreement existed at the time, Professor Powell suggests that
when we look to the founding-era period for insight into current
constitutional questions, we should not search primarily for the
founders' original intent. Instead, we can gain more insight
from the study of the common terms and language-the political
grammar of early constitutional law-in which debate was
voiced.
In 1792, American diplomat and writer Joel Barlow published a
critical analysis of the French Constitution which had been drafted the
previous year.1 Drawing on the American experience with constitution
making and interpreting, Barlow argued that the proper purpose of a
constitution was to establish "the great fundamental principle that all
men are equal in their rights" and to create basic safeguards for that prin-
ciple.2 The value of a properly devised constitution, however, went be-
yond establishing the rules within which government was obliged to act:
Barlow thought that a constitution "ought to serve not only as a guide to
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1975, St. David's University College, Uni-
versity of Wales; J.D. 1982, Yale University; Ph.D. 1991, Duke University. My thanks to
Chris Schroeder and Paul Carrington for comments and encouragement and to the Carolina
Academic Press for permission to rework parts of the introduction to JEFFERSON POWELL,
LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(1991), into sections of this Article.
1. Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France on the Defects in the
Constitution of 1791 (New York 1792), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DUR-
ING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1815, at 812-38 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983) [hereinafter AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING].
2. Id. at 823-24. Later in the letter, Barlow described the task of a constitutional con-
vention as "tracing the outlines of your constitution, according to your present ideas, and
proclaiming it in the most solemn manner, as the foundation of law and right." Id. at 838.
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the legislative body, but as a political grammar to all the citizens. The
greatest service to be expected from it is, that it should concentrate the
maxims, and form the habits of thinking, for the whole community." 3
Barlow's recommendation to the French Assembly that it write a
constitution that could serve as "the political grammar" of society cap-
tured a central element of the founding-era American experience with
constitutionalism.4 Their state and federal constitutions, Americans
quickly discovered, were not merely sets of rules organizing and limiting
the institutions of government. Indeed, to the extent that the constitu-
tions contained rules, those rules all too frequently were ambiguous, as
likely to create disputes as to settle them. The American constitutions
shaped a public culture much as Barlow thought a constitution should,
but it was a culture of debate. The possession of a common "political
grammar" did not eliminate deep political disagreement in the early
United States; instead, constitutionalism served as the language through
which those disagreements could be articulated.
The founders' constitutional disputes were worrisome and even ex-
asperating at the time.' The existence of "original disagreement" also
troubles many late twentieth-century American constitutionalists, in part
because it renders problematic the invocation of "the founders" in consti-
tutional debate. The hypothesis underlying this Article is that our ten-
dency to search for the constitutional views founding-era Americans
generally shared has led us to ignore what was perhaps their greatest
achievement-the creation of a shared political and legal language that
made reasoned debate possible.6 It was the "political grammar" of the
founding era that decisively shaped "the habits of thinking" and acting of
later Americans. Constitutional historians, therefore, would do well to
3. Id. at 823. Thomas Paine used the same metaphor a year before Barlow. See PAINE,
THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE
300 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1969): "The American Constitutions were to liberty, what a gram-
mar is to language: they define its parts of speech, and practically construct them into syntax."
4. This article deals with the constitutional discourse of the period roughly between the
ratification of the federal Constitution and the "market revolution" of the Jacksonian period.
See generally CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION, 1815-1846 (1991) (discussing
the continuities and differences between pre-Jacksonian and Jacksonian America).
5. An anonymous pamphleteer of the period sarcastically remarked that the creators of
the Federal Constitution were "[s]o far... from boasting of an inspiration in this work, that
neither two of them can agree to understand the instrument in the same sense." An Impartial
Citizen, A Dissertation Upon the Constitutional Freedom of the Press (Boston 1801), reprinted
in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 1, at 1126, 1128.
6. I am indebted to Professor Sanford Levinson's provocative work for my understand-




attend to the vocabulary and structure of founding-era discussion if they
are to understand that era's legacy.
The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the growing body of
scholarship that focuses on the terms rather than the particular outcomes
of early constitutional debate.7 The Article examines some of the terms
and patterns of argument founding-era Americans employed in constitu-
tional discussion:' the role of concepts of "text," meaning, and precedent
in constitutional interpretation;9 the significance of ascribing interpretive
authority to various institutions; 0 and the complex of questions sur-
rounding the notions of "sovereignty" and "discretion."" The portrait
of early constitutionalism that this Article identifies is very similar to
Barlow's metaphor of a "political grammar." The concluding section of
the Article suggests that the contemporary interest in constructing deter-
minate theories of constitutional meaning is fundamentally alien to the
constitutionalism created by the founding-era. 2
I. THE SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
A fundamental question often raised in early constitutional argu-
ment-as it has been again today-concerned the sources of constitu-
tional argument. In discussing the scope of legislative or executive
authority or the validity of an asserted individual right, founding-era
Americans often turned to the logically prior question of what modalities
of argument 3 were permissible in constitutional debate. Substantive
7. Two outstanding examples are 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MAR-
SHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35 (1988) & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING (1991).
8. See JOHN G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 3-41 (1973) (discussing
the value of studying the underlying structures of political discourse). "The historian's first
problem, then, is to identify the 'language' or 'vocabulary' with and within which the author
operated, and to show how it functioned paradigmatically to prescribe what he might say and
how he might say it." Id. at 25.
9. See infra notes 30-150 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 151-218 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 219-375 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 376-82 and accompanying text.
13. I borrow the concept of modalities of interpretation from Philip Bobbitt's great book,
PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). Bobbitt defines "constitutional
modalities" as "the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a constitu-
tional point of view." Id at 12. He identifies six basic modalities in modem constitutional
law:
the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitu-
tion); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they
would be interpreted by the average contemporary "man on the street"); structural
(inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the
19931
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constitutional disagreements often turned on conflict over the propriety
of a particular type of constitutional-law argument.
A. The Role of Constitutional Text
The primary and superficially uncontroversial founding-era modal-
ity of interpretation was textual: virtually everyone agreed that the defin-
ing characteristic of American constitutionalism was the existence of
written constitutional instruments."4 Judge St. George Tucker stated in
1794 that before the American Revolution the world had not truly un-
derstood the notion of a constitution:
What the constitution of any country was or rather was sup-
posed to be, could only be collected from what the government
had at any time done; what had been acquiesced in by the peo-
ple, or other component parts of the government; or what had
been resisted by either of them. Whatever the government or
any branch of it had once done, it was inferred they had a right
to do again.1
5
But Americans, Tucker went on to say, had changed all that by writing
down their fundamental laws. "[W]ith us, the constitution is not an
'ideal thing, but a real existence: it can be produced in a visible form:' its
principles can be ascertained from the living letter, not from obscure rea-
soning or deductions only." 6 The Federal Constitution, Representative
Peter Porter reminded the House in 1811, was "aprinted Constitution...
drawn up with the greatest care and deliberation; with the utmost atten-
tion to perspicuity and precision."' 7
From the basic premise of the textuality of American constitutions,
founding-era Americans drew the corollary that an American constitu-
tion is "the first law of the land." 8 Unlike, for example, the English Bill
of Rights of 1689, which put legal constraints only on the Crown and not
on Parliament, an American constitution
is to the governors, or rather to the departments of government,
what a law is to individuals-nay, it is not only a rule of action
structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (de-
riving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected
in the Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a
particular rule).
Id. at 12-13.
14. On the theoretical importance of the textual nature of American constitutions, see 1d.
at 3-5.
15. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (Gen. Ct. 1793) (Tucker, J.).
16. Id.
17. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 643 (1811).
18. Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78 (Tucker, J.).
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to the branches of government, but it is that from which their
existence flows, and by which the powers... which may have
been committed to them, are prescribed-It is their commis-
sion-nay, it is their creator.1 9
John Marshall said nothing controversial in deciding Marbury v.
Madison when he asserted that the status of "fundamental and para-
mount law" is "essentially attached to a written constitution."2 Again
and again, throughout the founding period, constitutionalists affirmed
the connection between the American constitutions' written nature, their
supreme legal authority, and their capacity to render definite and fixed
the forms and limits of governmental power. As an anonymous essayist
wrote early in the Revolution, "individuals by agreeing to erect forms of
government... must give up some part of their liberty for that purpose;
and it is the particular business of a Constitution to make out how much
they shall give up" by express provisions "say[ing] to the legislative pow-
ers, 'Thus far shalt thou go, and no further.' "21
The importance of the connection between textualism and the distri-
bution and limitation of power was evident in the undercurrent of worry
that sometimes can be detected about the ambiguity of constitutional
texts. While the Constitution was being drafted, Madison repeatedly ar-
gued for the need to give Congress an institutional check on state legisla-
tion violating the Constitution's restrictions on state power. "[T]he
impossibility of dividing powers of legislation in such a manner, as to be
free from different constructions by different interests, or even from am-
biguity in the judgment of the impartial, requires some such expedi-
ent."22 The great Anti-federalist writer "Brutus" argued that the very
tools of textual construction applied by an impartial interpreter would
break down all limits on federal power if applied to the proposed Consti-
tution: "It is a rule in construing a law to consider the objects the legisla-
ture had in view in passing it, and to give it such an explanation as to
promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a consti-
tution." But applying such a rule to the Constitution, "Brutus" con-
tended, would legitimate congressional authority "to make all laws
which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to promote
the general welfare." Textual construction, in other words, could sub-
vert the very limiting function of making a constitution into a text: "This
19. Id. at 24 (Nelson, J.).
20. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
21. Anonymous, Four Letters on Interesting Subjects (Philadelphia 1776), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN POLrrICAL WRITING, supra note 1, at 368, 385.
22. Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 205,
211 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (discussing
Madison's struggle to include a congressional check on state legislation).
1993]
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amounts to a power to make laws at discretion."23
For many founding-era Americans the textual nature of American
constitutionalism brought with it institutional implications. The cen-
trality of constitutional documents, for example, often provided the basis
for asserting or accepting the legitimacy of some form of judicial review.
In 1808, Judge John Davis held that the judicial power to declare stat-
utes "void exists, only, in cases of contravention, opposition or repug-
nancy, to some express restrictions or provisions contained in the
constitution."24 Davis rejected the argument that a federal court could
hold unconstitutional an exercise of congressional authority solely on the
basis of the claim that Congress had exceeded the scope of a textually
delegated power as "extremely difficult, if not impracticable, in execu-
tion."2 On the other hand, "[a]ffirmative provisions and express restric-
tions, contained in the constitution, are sufficiently definite to render
decisions, probably in all cases, satisfactory. '26 By creating written con-
stitutions Americans had rendered constitutional debate susceptible to
legal resolution: As James Kent explained to his law students in 1794,
"the interpretation or construction of the Constitution is as much as a
judicial act, and requires the exercise of the same legal discretion, as the
interpretation or construction of a Law."27
Almost a quarter century later, James Madison explained his veto of
an internal improvements bill as a defense of the United States Constitu-
tion's written nature and thus of the federal courts' power of judicial
review. The bill's supporters justified its legitimacy on the ground that
the bill's effects would be beneficial to the nation,28 but Madison rejected
this reasoning as subversive both of the nature of the Constitution and of
the existence of judicial review as a safeguard of the Constitution. If
Congress were not limited to the powers textually delegated to it but
were free to legislate on all issues involving the common defense and
general welfare, Madison explained, "the effect" would be to "exclud[e]
the judicial authority of the United States from its participation in guard-
ing the boundary between the legislative powers of the General and the
State Governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general wel-
23. Brutus V, To the People of the State of New York (Dec. 13, 1787), in 2 HERBERT J.
STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 9.57 (1981).
24. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 619 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) (em-
phasis added).
25. Id. at 620.
26. Id
27. James Kent, Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures (New York Nov. 17,
1794), in 2 AMERICAN POLrICAL WRITING, supra note 1, at 936, 942.




fare, being questions of policy and expediency, are unsusceptible of judi-
cial cognizance and decision."
'29
B. Methods of Textual Interpretation
The emergence of severe disagreement on the interpretation of the
Federal Constitution in the early 1790s produced extensive debate over
the appropriate methods of interpreting the constitutional text. 30 Oppo-
nents of expansive views of congressional power seized upon the Federal
Constitution's textuality from the beginning as a major component of
their argument against Alexander Hamilton's nationalist political pro-
gram. 31  Madison's great 1791 speech attacking Hamilton's bank bill
32
29. James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 584, 585 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) [hereinafter MESSAGES
AND PAPERS].
30. The political labels of the founding era create terminological problems for the modern
reader. During the struggle over ratification, the Constitution's proponents appropriated the
term "Federalist," successfully relegating their protesting opponents to the negative "Anti-
federalist." When the original Federalists divided over political and constitutional differences
in the early 1790s, the supporters of President Washington's administration and of Alexander
Hamilton's legislative proposals adopted the "Federalist" label in an effort to brand their foes
as enemies of the Constitution. The latter, many of whom had been fervent supporters of
ratification, came to describe themselves by the middle of the decade as "Republicans" in an
effort to brand Hamilton and his allies as crypto-Tories and monarchists. Thus, James
Madison was a "Federalist" of 1788, but a "Republican" of 1795, while Patrick Henry, a
leading "Anti-federalist" of the ratification period, was by the late 1790s a "Federalist." Dur-
ing the 1790s, Federalists generally endorsed expansive views of federal power and executive
authority, while Republicans usually insisted on a narrow construction of federal power and
on legislative supremacy. With the Republican capture of the Presidency and Congress in the
election of 1800, a takeover that proved permanent, Republicans tended to become less wary of
national power and Federalists more enthusiastic about decentralized government. By the
second decade of the nineteenth century, the mainstream leadership of the Republicans en-
dorsed nationalist constitutional views, and opposition to centralized power characterized New
England Federalists but only a minority of the Republican party.
31. Hamilton and his allies in the First Congress implemented an ambitious legislative
program intended to secure the Federal Union and place it on the road to becoming a strong,
centralized commercial republic. Their immediate goals were to create an efficient federal
administrative apparatus and to restore the public credit of the United States by federal as-
sumption of the states' debts and the creation of a sound federal fiscal system. The establish-
ment of a national bank was of central importance to this program. See FORREST
McDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 117-210 (1979) (describing the nation-
alist program). By interweaving the new federal government with society's commercial
growth, the nationalists hoped to insure the strength and safety of both. ItL at 122.
32. Madison's attack on Hamilton's bill was the opening shot in a several decades-long
debate over the constitutionality of a national bank. Despite Madison's opposition, Congress
passed the bill in early 1791, and President Washington signed it over the written objections of
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph. BRAY HAM-
MOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 116-
22 (1957). The bill provided that the charter of the Bank of the United States would expire in
1811, and the efforts of the Bank's supporters to renew the charter failed in that year when
Vice President George Clinton cast the deciding vote in the Senate against renewal on constitu-
1993]
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began with what was virtually a mini-treatise on the construction of a
written constitution; for Madison, proper constitutional argument de-
pended on obedience to a definable set of interpretive principles.
Madison laid particular emphasis on his claim that the bank bill could be
justified only by a reading of the text that would "render nugatory the
enumeration of particular powers."33 Madison did not deny that Con-
gress legitimately might exercise "accessory or subaltern" powers, not
enumerated in the text, that were "necessary and proper for executing
the enumerated powers." He maintained, however, that it was illegiti-
mate for Congress to wield a nontextual "great and important power"
simply because that power was "necessary and proper for the govern-
ment or union."3 In his cabinet opinion rejecting the constitutionality
of the bank, Thomas Jefferson was, if possible, even more insistent that
Congress be confined by the text ("[ilt was intended to lace them up
straitly," he wrote) to its "enumerated powers, and those without which,
as means, these powers could not be carried into effect."35 For an im-
plied power to fit within the confines of Jefferson's necessary and proper
clause, it thus had to be one "without which [a textual] grant of power
would be nugatory."36 For both Madison and Jefferson, the Constitu-
tion's political grammar was essentially restrictive, intended to cabin in
the dangers of governmental power.
Supporters of an expansive view of federal power responded not by
denying the Constitution's textual nature but by criticizing the interpre-
tive practices of their opponents. Representative Fisher Ames attacked
Madison's claim of unique loyalty to the Constitution's textual limits on
tional grounds. Id. at 222. However, with the support of President Madison (who by now had
accepted that precedent established the constitutionality of a national bank), a new bank act
passed in 1816; a 1834 bill to renew the second Bank's charter was vetoed by President An-
drew Jackson for constitutional and other reasons. Id. at 438. Efforts to charter a third Bank
were stymied by two constitutionally based vetoes of President John Tyler in 1841. Id. at 543.
33. James Madison, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 22, at 372, 375.
34. Id. at 378, 379.
35. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank (Feb. 15, 1791) [hereinafter Bank Opinion], in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS
416, 418 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
36. Years later, Jefferson's vigorous call for a narrow reading of the Federal Constitu-
tion's grants of power was to cause him some embarrassment as his administration and its
congressional allies exercised power (most notably to purchase the Louisiana Territory) that
arguably appeared to be neither textually delegated nor properly adjunct to some enumerated
power. Jefferson's consistent justification of the purchase, which he privately viewed at the
time as unconstitutional, was that he and the congressional majority had acted beyond the law
in the best interests of the country, in a matter of the greatest urgency, and, being willing to
"throw [themselves] on the justice of [their] country," were vindicated by popular approval.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282 (Paul C. Ford ed., 1898) [hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS].
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power as false. Do "the opposers of the bank," he asked, "mark out the
limits of power which they will leave to us with more certainty than is
done by the advocates of the bank? Their rules of interpretation... will
be found as obscure, and of course as formidable as that which they con-
demn." 7 Ames flatly refused to concede that Madison and his allies had
the constitutional text on their side: "[T]hey only set up one construc-
tion against another.13' Hamilton himself crafted an elaborate argument
in support of the bank bill in his cabinet opinion. Jefferson's strict inter-
pretation of "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause3 9 was re-
quired neither by "the grammatical, nor popular sense of the term,"
whereas the "whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates, that it was
the intent of the convention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the
exercise of the specified powers."'  Jefferson's apparent hostility toward
congressional power rested not on the requirements of the text but on the
busy activity of the "[i]magination," '41 Hamilton insisted. A true respect
for the written Constitution required instead the application of the
"sound maxim of construction" that governmental powers "ought to be
construed liberally in advancement of the public good."'42 Ames and
Hamilton found in the Constitution an endorsement of governmental ac-
tion for the benefit of society; their political grammar was expansive,
open-ended, linked to the benign purposes of the Constitution rather
than to its textual details.43
Throughout the founding period, nationalists and their opponents
battled over who could lay proper claim to the text in support of their
constitutional views. Representative Alexander Smyth confidently as-
sumed in 1818 that faithfulness to the text required a narrow reading of
federal authority-he described "liberal construction" as "a stretch of
37. Fisher Ames, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 3, 1791), in 2 WORKS
OF FISHER AMES 850, 854 (W.B. Allen ed., 1983).
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
40. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality on an Act to Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 102-03 (Harold C. Syrett
ed., 1965) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS].
41. Id. at 101.
42. Id. at 105.
43. Ames stated that
Congress may do what is necessary to the end for which the Constitution was
adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural rights of man, or to those which
they have expressly reserved to themselves, or to the powers which are assigned to
the states.... That construction may be maintained to be a safe one which promotes
the good of society, and the ends for which the government was adopted, without
impairing the rights of any man, or the powers of any state.
Ames, supra note 37, at 856.
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the Constitution" and a "usurpation" of power.44 But Justice Joseph
Story was equally confident, writing two years before, that "a reasonable
construction, according to the import of [the Constitution's] terms," sup-
ported his own nationalist views.45 Other debates concerned the relation-
ship between the Constitution's text and political concepts such as that of
the separation of powers, or the "mixed" constitution. Albert Gallatin,
for example, assured the House of Representatives in 1798 that the Con-
stitution embodied a system of checks and balances: "We have always
been taught to believe that, in all mixed Governments and especially in
our own, the different departments mutually operated as checks one
upon the other."' 46 Others rejected the application of concepts drawn
from political theory as an interpretive mistake: William Branch Giles
argued in 1808 that "[i]t was his wish to discard these technical, general
terms, which rather embarrass than assist us in the correct interpretation
of the Constitution.... [T]he Constitution, as it is, should be a standard
of interpretation, not what it is described to be by general borrowed mis-
applied phrases."'47
The interminable debate over how to read constitutional language
produced a variety of attempts to capture the political grammar of the
Constitution in a formula. In the 1790s nationalistic Federalists tended
to emphasize the purposive nature of the text, its orientation toward au-
thorizing certain ends and achieving certain purposes. Ames was repre-
sentative: "Congress may do what is necessary to the end for which the
Constitution was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural
rights of man or to those which they have expressly reserved to them-
selves or to the powers which are assigned to the states. '4 Opposition
constitutionalists, not surprisingly, focused on the Constitution's limiting
functions; in 1803, Tucker wrote that
[a]s federal it is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the
antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in question; as a so-
cial compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict con-
struction, wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal
security, or of private property may become the subject of
dispute.49
44. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1146 (1818).
45. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
46. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1121-22 (1798).
47. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 115-16 (1808).
48. Ames, supra note 37, at 856.
49. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA app. at 140, 151 (St. George Tucker 1803). The connection the opposition
[Vol. 71
POLITICAL GRAMMAR
The emergence of Republican nationalism in the wake of the War of
1812 brought with it new and creative efforts to explicate standards for
constitutional interpretation.50  As Henry Clay insisted i 1818, these
new nationalists regarded themselves as faithful heirs of "the principles
of '98"1;51 Clay cited Madison's Report of 1800 and then explained that
"from that paper, and from others of analogous principles, he had im-
bibed those constitutional principles which had influenced his political
course."'5 2 But Clay, like most other Republican leaders in post-war
Washington, had come to fear federal weakness more than federal op-
pression. As a consequence, his formulation of the proper approach to
construing the Federal Constitution was an attempt to reconcile nation-
alist goals with Republican principles. Clay explained:
In expounding the instrument, constructions unfavorable to
personal freedom, or those which might lead to great abuse,
ought to be carefully avoided. But if, on the contrary, the con-
struction insisted upon was, in all its effects and consequences,
beneficent; if it were free from the danger of abuse; if it pro-
moted and advanced all the great objects which led to the con-
federacy; if it materially tended to effect the greatest of all those
objects-the cementing of the Union, the construction was rec-
ommended by the most favorable considerations.53
The Republican Clay's standard of interpretation, and indeed his appli-
cation of it, scarcely differed from that enunciated a year later by the
Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall:54 "Let the end be legitimate, let
Republicans drew between the Federal Constitution's textuality and its bias (as they saw it)
against power logically might have influenced in a libertarian direction their treatment of state
constitutions (which, for the most part, were entirely instruments of restraint rather than spec-
ifications of authority). Although there were occasional hints of this, see Chancellor George
Wythe's unreported opinion in Hudgins v. Wright, discussed in Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.)
133, 134 (1806), there seem to have been few systematic differences in this period between
Republicans and Federalists on state constitutional issues. See, eg., People v. Croswell, 3
Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804) (a famous freedom of speech case where a Republican judge
joined the lone Federalist on the bench in accepting Alexander Hamilton's argument in de-
fense of free speech; the other two Republican judges rejected the speech argument).
50. As noted supra note 49, Republican constitutional opinion tended to drift in a nation-
alist direction after the Republicans secured control of the national government in 1801. The
War of 1812, which seemed to many to prove the necessity of a centralized government for the
health and even survival of the Republic, accelerated this tendency. See SELLERS, supra note
4, at 70-102 (describing post-war Republican nationalism).
51. Republicans of the early nineteenth century usually professed allegiance to the consti-
tutional doctrines articulated in the famous Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and
the Report of 1800 written by Madison.
52. Henry Clay, Speech on Internal Improvements (March 7, 1818), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
HENRY CLAY 448 (James F. Hopkins ed., 1961) [hereinafter CLAY PAPERS].
53. Id at 449.
54. The rapprochement between newly nationalistic Republicans such as Clay and tradi-
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it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."" Earlier in his opinion Marshall acknowledged, as Clay had,
that cases involving "the great principles of liberty" might require more
searching interpretive scrutiny.16 For Clay and Marshall, the rules gov-
erning constitutional argument over the distribution of legitimate govern-
mental power were not identical to those concerning constitutional
limitations on power.
On occasion, arguments about the meaning of a constitutional text
were couched in terms of a narrow literalism. Delivering his opinion in
Chisholm v. Georgia on the question of whether Article III of the Consti-
tution 7 authorized a suit against an unwilling state by the citizen of an-
other state, Justice John Blair asserted that "[t]he constitution of the
United States is the only fountain from which I shall draw; the only au-
thority to which I shall appeal." 8 For Justice Blair, the question
presented in Chisholm, therefore, was easy: "A dispute between A. and
B. is surely a dispute between B. and A."5 9 By contrast, in Kamper v.
Hawkins, Justice William Nelson was unwilling to draw any certain con-
clusion from the verbal structure of a sentence in the Virginia Constitu-
tion's provision regarding the state judiciary:' "[P]erhaps it would be
tionally nationalistic Federalists such as Marshall was embodied in the person of Marshall's
colleague, Joseph Story. Story was a Massachusetts Republican whose adherence to the party
of Jefferson was the cause of significant personal disadvantage early in his career; Madison
appointed him to the Supreme Court to secure a majority of the seats on the Court for Repub-
licans. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUB-
LIC 45-52 (1985) (describing Story's problems as a young Republican lawyer in Federalist
Massachusetts); id. at 70-71 (discussing Story's appointment to the Court). Once on the
Court, Story quickly established a position as perhaps the most nationalistic of the Justices, id.
at 97-114, while retaining at first a partisan self-identification as a Republican. See Letter from
Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams (Feb. 22, 1815), in 1 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND
LETTRS OF JOSEPH STORY 254 (1851) (discussing the Republican party's "golden opportu-
nity" to place itself "permanently in power," Story wrote, "I pray God that it may not be
thrown away").
55. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
56. Id at 401.
57. The immediately relevant language of Article III was "the judicial power shall extend
... to controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1.
58. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450 (1793) (Blair, J.).
59. Id.
60. The state constitution directed the legislature to appoint "judges of the supreme court
of appeals, and general court, judges in chancery." VA. CONST. art. XIV (1776). Nelson
considered but rejected as overnice the argument that the repetition of the word "judges"
"evinced an intention that the judges of the general court and those in chancery should be
distinct persons." Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 33 (Nelson, J. 1793).
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unjustifiable to rest such an opinion on so critical a construction."61 In-
deed, the rejection of literalism sometimes went even further. A literal
interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, Justice Samuel Chase con-
cluded in Calder v. Bull,62 was simply impossible; he was "under a neces-
sity to give a construction, or explanation of the words 'ex post facto
laws,' because they have not any certain meaning attached to them."63
Justice William Johnson held a similar opinion of the Contracts Clause,"
expressing regret that "words of less equivocal signification had not been
adopted in that Article of the Constitution."65 Justice Johnson was con-
fident that the Constitution was not meant to prohibit a great variety of
beneficial legislative adjustments of contract law, but professed himself
(almost) at a loss about "where to draw the line, or how to define or limit
the words, 'obligation of contracts.' "66
Constitutional arguments in this period often rested on the claim
that some of the terms used in a constitution had fixed or technical mean-
ings prior to their use there, and that these meanings were "incorpo-
rated" into the constitution itself. Despite their dislike for the
retrospective state legislative action at issue in Calder, the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court refused to invalidate it as a violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause. As Justice Chase pointed out, the term "ex post
facto law," according to Blackstone, Woodeson (Blackstone's successor
as Vinerian Professor), the Federalist, and the constitutions of Massachu-
setts, Maryland and North Carolina, referred only to laws creating or
increasing criminal liability.67 Since Calder did not involve the criminal
law, the Court held the Ex Post Facto Clause inapplicable. The Justices
believed, as Justice William Paterson explained, that the words of the
clause "must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and
general acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense."6
The debate over the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 179869
61. Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 33 (Nelson, J.).
62. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
63. Id at 395 (Chase, J.).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
65. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810) (Johnson, J.).
66. Id at 145 (Johnson, J.).
67. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391 (Chase, J.).
68. Id at 397 (Paterson, J.).
69. 1 Stat. 596 (1798). A Federalist-controlled Congress passed the Sedition Act as well
as three statutes dealing with naturalization and the control of resident aliens. See 1 Stat. 566
(1798) (increasing residency period necessary for naturalization from five to fourteen years); 1
Stat. 570 (1798) (authorizing deportation of aliens the President deemed dangerous); 1 Stat.
577 (1798) (authorizing detention or deportation of alien enemies in wartime). The Sedition
Act criminalized the publication of "false, scandalous and malicious... writings" defaming
the President, Congress, or the federal government generally, during the undeclared naval war
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produced a variety of arguments over how to employ the pre-adoption
history of language used in the United States Constitution in the inter-
pretation of that instrument. Defending the Act, Representative Harri-
son Gray Otis used the same form of argument accepted by the Justices
in Calder. Otis cited Blackstone as well as pre-1789 state law to support
his claim that when the First Amendment guaranteed "the freedom of
speech, [and] of the press" it had used terminology with "a certain (i.e.,
fixed] and technical meaning." So understood, "the liberty of the press is
merely an exemption from all previous restraints," which restraints, of
course, the Sedition Act made no attempt to create.70 Critics of the Act
responded that the profound political differences between "the British
government and the American constitutions" 71 rendered this crabbed
Blackstonian understanding of freedom of the press inapplicable to an
American constitutional provision. Madison's 1798 Virginia Resolutions
and his Report of 1800 added a second argument.72 The Virginia state
convention that ratified the Federal Constitution had submitted with its
instrument of ratification both a resolution explaining that it approved
the Constitution with the understanding that "the liberty of conscience
and of the press, cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by
any authority of the United States" 73 as well as a proposed amendment
(also suggested by other state conventions, Madison added) safeguarding
those freedoms. 74 This history, Madison argued, reenforced his claim
that according to the "plain sense and intention" 75 of the First Amend-
ment, the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.
with France of 1798-1801. The Alien and Sedition Acts were motivated at least in part by
genuine fears that critics of the government were intentionally preparing the Republic for so-
cial revolution or French invasion, but they obviously were susceptible to employment for
partisan Federalist purposes. See PRESSER, supra note 7, at 118-21 (discussing the Sedition
Act's purposes).
70. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2147-48 (1798).
71. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800) [hereinafter Report of 1800], In 17
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 22, at 336.
72. In response to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson and Madison
secretly drafted two sets of resolutions denouncing the constitutionality of the Acts. The Ken-
tucky legislature adopted Jefferson's resolutions, with some modifications, in November 1798,
and the Virginia legislature approved Madison's set the following month. To the disappoint-
ment of the Republican leadership, no other state endorsed the resolutions, and indeed several
Northern state legislatures formally denounced them. The Kentucky legislature adopted a
brief reiteration of its position in 1799, and Madison (who entered the Virginia General As-
sembly for this purpose) wrote a report vindicating the Virginia Resolutions that was approved
in January 1800. Politically unsuccessful at the time, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
of 1798 and 1799 and Madison's Report of 1800 enjoyed a prominent afterlife as the official
standard of Republican orthodoxy.
73. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 345.
74. Id. at 345-46.
75. Id. at 308.
[Vol. 71
POLITICAL GRAMMAR
The language of "intent(ion)," invoked by Jefferson and Madison in
their respective 1798 resolutions, played a varying role in constitutional
debate in this period. At times, as in the 1799 Kentucky Resolutions'
reference to the Constitution's "obvious and real intention, '76 these
terms seem to be little more than synonyms for "meaning," and to be
compatible with various forms of strictly textual argument. On certain,
relatively rare occasions, the suggestion was made that the meaning of
constitutional language could be established by consulting the history of
its creation; such invocations of the modern modality of originalist inter-
pretation seldom if ever went unchallenged." Madison, for example,
criticized President Washington for a 1796 message to the House of Rep-
resentatives, referring to the actions of the Philadelphia fiamers as mis-
guided because it was the state ratifying conventions that turned the
framers' "draught of a plan, nothing but a dead letter" into a living fun-
damental law. 8 Madison recalled that his own incidental reference to
the framers in a 1791 speech against the national bank bill "was animad-
verted on by several" other congressmen, including Madison's fellow-
framer Elbridge Gerry, who "protest[ed], in strong terms, against argu-
ments drawn from that source"; indeed, Madison asserted, "he did not
believe a single instance could be cited in which the sense of the Conven-
tion had been required or admitted as material in any Constitutional
question."'79 For the most part, the attitude of constitutionalists in this
period was expressed by Judge Roane interpreting the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights in an 1804 case. Having "examined the journals of the
convention [which drafted and adopted the Declaration] touching the
present subject," Roane explained, he was satisfied that there was "in
them nothing varying the construction, arising from the instrument it-
76. Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 (Nov. 22, 1799), in 4 ANNALS OF AMERICA 106 (Wil-
liam Benton ed., 1968).
77. See Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103-07 (1991) (discussing historical use of "intent" language). The
point is not, of course, that founding-era Americans did not invoke the original and intended
meaning of constitutional instruments in argument, but that they did not customarily regard
the tools of originalist interpretation (e.g., the records of framing or ratifying conventions) as
dispositive of that meaning.
78. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 22, at 296.
79. Id. at 295. Madison also expressed doubts about the value of the records of the state
conventions, although those bodies were the legal creators of the Constitution-as-law. The
state conventions' debates, he insisted, were not entirely to be trusted for accuracy: even Vir-
ginia's, the most trustworthy, "contained internal evidence in abundance of chasms, and mis-
conceptions of what was said." Id. Even the conventions' formal acts-Madison had in view
the various proposals for constitutional amendments-lacked "precision and system" and in-
cluded "apparent inconsistencies" due to "[t]he agitations of the public mind on that occasion"
and "the hurry and compromise" in which the amendments were drafted. Id. at 296-97.
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self." But Roane had done so solely "as a matter of curiosity," for he
"deem[ed] it right to reject all extraneous information in forming [his]
conclusion upon the constitution."80 Roane, as we shall see below, was
no textual literalist, but neither he nor anyone else in the period regarded
the records of a constitution's origins as the sole determinants of a consti-
tution's meaning.
C. Extra-Textual Constitutional Argument
American constitutional discourse in this period was not conducted
solely in terms of arguments from, or about the meaning of, the texts of
the federal and state constitutions. Indeed, a striking feature of early
constitutional debate was the invocation of a veritable host of extratex-
tual authorities: "the spirit of the Constitution"; the "fundamental prin-
ciples" of the constitution, of free government, or of republicanism;
"natural justice"; and so on. Such phrases often are difficult to interpret
with confidence,81 although certain general tendencies in their use do
seem to be identifiable.
Apparent references to extratextual sources of constitutional mean-
ing often were nothing more than rhetorical modes of rejecting a narrow
literalism. In 1793, Attorney General Edmund Randolph argued to the
United States Supreme Court that, having shown that he had "the ad-
vantage of the letter [of Article III] on [his] side," he would then "advert
to the spirit of the Constitution, or rather its genuine and necessary inter-
pretation."82 Randolph's subsequent remarks primarily addressed other
clauses of the Constitution as well as its overall nature. Randolph's
"spirit of the constitution" seems equivalent to Justice James Wilson's
"general texture of the Constitution" in Wilson's opinion in the same
case.83 The point of such rhetoric was to insist on the legitimacy of treat-
ing the constitutional text as a coherent whole with an overall structure
rather than as a collection of isolated and disparate rules. Hamilton's
discussion of "resulting powers" in his 1791 bank opinion is in large part
the same sort of argument: The Congress legitimately possesses not only
the discrete powers explicitly enumerated in the text, and the (again dis-
crete) implied powers accompanying the former, but also those powers
80. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 176 (1804) (Roane, J.).
81. For three important, although by no means identical, treatments, see Terry Brennan,
Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent, " 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 965, 1028-29 (1992); Leslie F. Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial
Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. PoL. 51, 69 (1986); and Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1127, 1176-77 (1987).
82. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 421 (1793) (stating argument of counsel).
83. Id. at 465 (Wilson, J.).
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that "result from the whole mass of the powers of the government" con-
tained in the Constitution.84 Hamilton went on, however, to refer to a
second justification for the existence of the "resulting powers"-"the na-
ture of political society"-which is an example of a second form of argu-
ment in extratextual terms.
References to "fundamental principles" and similar phrases fre-
quently seem to allude to those political values, theories, and goals which
the speaker or writer believed were the background of a constitutional
text, and were therefore somehow embodied in it. This form of argument
clearly went beyond textual exegesis without thereby asserting the direct
or unmediated constitutional significance of extratextual principle. In
1793 Judge John Tyler defined the Virginia Constitution in successive
sentences as "the great contract of the people" and as "[a] system of
fundamental principles."8" It was a "fundamental principle" of the Vir-
ginia Constitution, Judge Tucker asserted in 1804, "that private property
shall be sacred and inviolable,"86 and legislative acts protecting property
rights "may be considered as pursuing the injunctions of moral jus-
tice."87 But this great moral principle did not need to be ascertained
through philosophical inquiry, for it could be found in "our bill of
rights."88 A decade later, North Carolina Chief Justice John Louis Tay-
lor described a state law permitting debtors to obtain stays on the execu-
tion of adverse judgments as a violation of "the first principles of
justice,"89 but he plainly did not rest his decision invalidating the law on
that basis. Taylor instead described the Federal Constitution as designed
to embody the "master principles and comprehensive truths" of political
morality and thereby "to give them practical effect." 90 The North Caro-
lina statute could not be enforced because it was "clearly irreconcila-
ble"91 with "the plain and natural import of the words of the
Constitution of the United States."
92
Judges sometimes invoked the "spirit" or "principles" of a constitu-
tion to describe a constitutional principle that they believed implicit in or
imperfectly expressed by the text. President Edmund Pendleton of the
84. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 100.
85. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20, 59 (1793) (Tyler, J.).
86. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 152 (1804) (Tucker, J.).
87. Id.
88. Id. The first section of the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights ascribed to "all men"
"certain inherent ights... namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property." VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 1 (1776).
89. Jones v. Crittenden, 4 N.C (Car. L. Rep.) 55, 57 (1814).
90. Id. at 56.
91. Id. at 63-64.
92. Id. at 56.
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Virginia Court of Appeals explained an early constitutional decision of
his court as one that "preserved the Spirit of the Constitution and was
the best Interpretation which the Inaccurate words of the Constitution
would admit of."93 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall stated as a gen-
eral proposition of apparently fundamental nature that "[tihe very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." '94
Marshall's affimative assertion that the plaintiff before him possessed
such a right, however, rested on the text of Article III defining "the judi-
cial Power of the United States."95 Marshall stated, "This power is ex-
pressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States;
and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case;
because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States."96
Perhaps the most interesting set of extratextual arguments is that
which, arguably, indicated a judicial willingness to invalidate legislative
acts directly on the basis of extratextual principle.97 Unfortunately for
those scholars seeking to find founding-era examples of "noninterpre-
tivist" constitutional argument, most seemingly clear examples of judi-
cial review on extratextual grounds turn out on closer examination to be
ambiguous. The locus classicus is Justice Samuel Chase's opinion in Cal-
der v. Bull.95 Chase rather flamboyantly announced that
[t]here were certain vital principles in our free Republican gov-
ernments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and
flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest in-
justice by positive law... [t]he genius, the nature, and the spirit
of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts
of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid
them.
99
Chase's language at first seems unequivocally to endorse direct judicial
use of these principles regardless of their embodiment in a constitutional
93. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 2 LETTERS AND
PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON 428 (David J. Mays ed., 1967).
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
96. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-74.
97. On occasion, somewhat similar themes can be found in legislative contexts. For ex-
ample, Vice President Aaron Burr privately expressed concerns in 1802 about the eventually
successful attempt to abolish the circuit judgeships created by the 1801 "Midnight Judges
Act." Although he believed it clear that Congress possessed the "Constitutional right [and]
power" to do so, he questioned "whether it would be constitutionally Moral." Letter from
Aaron Burr to Barnabus Bidwell (Feb. 1, 1802), in 2 POLrlTCAL CORRESPONDENCE AND PUB-
LIC PAPERS OF AARON BURR 659-60 (Mary-Jo Kline & Joanne Wood Ryan eds., 1983).
98. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 395 (1798).
99. Id at 388.
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text: "To maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such
powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion,
be apolitical heresy, altogether inadmissible in ourfree republican govern-
ments."' °° Chase's actual behaviour, however, sets this interpretation of
his meaning in question. He resolved the case on the basis of a strictly
textual argument and, later in his opinion, apparently denied the Federal
Supreme Court's power to invalidate a state statute except "in a very
clear case" of conflict with the United States Constitution.101 Chase
probably meant to assert nothing more than the existence of principles of
political morality that bind legislators' consciences and that, to the extent
they are incorporated into a constitutional text, are enforceable by
courts.
Other well-known instances of extratextual judicial review present
similar ambiguities. Justice Joseph Story's opinion for a unanimous
Supreme Court in Terrett v. Taylor l02 arguably rested on the general
principle of vested rights in holding a state statute invalid. Story, how-
ever, summarized the Court's rationale in a sentence that yoked the tex-
tual and extratextual: "[W]e think ourselves standing upon the
principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free
government, upon the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United
States, and upon the decisions of the most respectable judicial tribu-
nals."103 Story, to be sure, did not explain on which part of the "letter of
the constitution" he had found his footing. In Fletcher v. Peck,"° Mar-
shall followed Hamilton's much earlier examplel0 5 of combining textual
and extratextual bases in order to invalidate Georgia's statutory revoca-
tion of land grants: "[T]he state of Georgia was restrained, either by
general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the
particular provisions of the constitution of the United States."' 06 Only
Justice William Johnson, in a concurring opinion, relied unequivocally
and exclusively on what he termed "a general principle, on the reason
and nature of things."'0 7
Argument-even ambiguous argument-from extratextual sources
of authority sometimes provoked criticism. Justice James Iredell re-
100. Id. at 388-89.
101. Id. at 393.
102. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 53 (1815).
103. Id. at 52.
104. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 125 (1810).
105. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Counsel (Mar. 25, 1796), in 4 THE LAW PRACTICE
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 430-31 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980).
106. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
107. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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sponded to Chase's opinion in Calder by denying that the Supreme Court
possessed any power to invalidate a statute "merely" because it was, in
the Court's opinion, "contrary to the principles of natural justice." 108
Iredell sharply distinguished the "ideas of natural justice [which] are reg-
ulated by no fixed standard [and upon which] the ablest and the purest
men have differed" from the "fundamental law" established by written
constitutions that "define[s] with precision the objects of the legislative
power, and... restrain[s] its exercise within marked and settled bounda-
ries."1 "9 Only the latter, in Iredell's view, could provide a legitimate ba-
sis for judicial review. Judges less dubious than Iredell about the
possibility of identifying the "dictates of moral justice" 110 nevertheless
shared his unwillingness to rest the power of judicial review on that basis:
Justice Tucker wrote in Turpin v. Locket that "a court of justice can only
pronounce the act [of the legislature] void so far as it contains any thing,
which the constitution of the commonwealth prohibits." ' The political
grammar of the founding era recognized the existence and importance of
broad principles of justice and free government; Americans, for the most
part, did not think that those principles were legally obligatory in the
same fashion as the textual commands of a constitutional instrument.
D. The Authority of Precedent in Constitutional Argument
The proper role of legislative and judicial precedent in constitutional
argument was ambiguous during this period. Americans often con-
trasted their written fundamental laws with the English "constitution,"
comprised of what Representative Peter B. Porter in 1811 called "imme-
morial usage or prescription.""1 2 The latter was, in its essence, nothing
but a collection of precedents: "Whatever the government, or any
branch of it had once done, it was inferred they had a right to do
again." 3 The very point of a "printed Constitution" thus might seem
the rejection of reliance on precedent, and such arguments were made on
a number of important occasions. When the national bank act came up
for renewal in 1811, its supporters relied in part on the argument that the
"Constitutional question" of its legitimacy "must be considered as set-
tled, adjudicated, and at rest." ' 4 The First Congress had debated fully
the act's constitutionality, and President Washington had approved it af-
108. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.).
109. Id.
110. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 150 (1804) (Tucker, J.).
111. Id. at 156.
112. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 643 (1811).
113. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (1793) (Tucker, J.).
114. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 642 (1811) (Rep. Porter's summary of his opponents' views).
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ter careful consideration of the issue; later Congresses, Presidents, and
the federal courts had assumed and acted upon the assumption that the
act was valid. Representative Porter attacked this argument as a "doc-
trine of prescriptive Constitutional rights," and explained subsequent ac-
quiescence in the original bank act as based on respect for the private
rights created by the act." 5 Senator Henry Clay denounced reliance on
legislative precedent as
fraught with the most mischievous consequences.... [O]nce
substitute practice for principle-the expositions of the consti-
tution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look
for the instrument in the instrument itselfl It will be as diffused
and intangible as the pretended constitution of England. And
it must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals
of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury
116
As members of Congress, Porter told the House, he and his colleagues
were "solemnly bound, by our oaths, to obey" the Constitution's "injunc-
tions.., as we, in our best judgments shall understand them and not as
they shall be interpreted to us by others.
' 17
Despite the theoretical cogency of Porter's and Clay's position, most
Americans of the period rejected it in favor of recognizing as legitimate
the role of legislative and judicial precedent in deciding constitutional
questions. Founding-era legal thought generally accepted a "tradition-
ary" concept of precedent: The decisions of courts and other law-declar-
ing institutions "claim[ed] authority not in virtue of having been decided
or settled, but in virtue of having a place within a recognized... process
of reflective judgment exercised within this body of experience, which is
itself authoritative because of its historical links to a shared sense of iden-
tity in the community.""'  Thus William W. Hening, an important early
reporter and legal writer, explained that "[a]ll judicial determinations, to
be regarded as authority, must be brought to the standard of justice and
common sense." The law could be considered settled only by the concur-
115. Id at 643.
116. Henry Clay, Speech on the Bill to Recharter the Bank of the United States (Feb. 15,
1811), in 1 CLAY PAPERS, supra note 52, at 537. Clay's remark about "reports of the Secretary
of the Treasury" was a reference to Hamilton's 1790 Second Report on the Further Provision
Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, which recommended the creation of a national bank.
See McDONALD, supra note 31, at 192-97 (describing the Second Report).
117. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 643 (1811).
118. Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of our Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 22
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION 10 (1986) (noting that in classical common law, judges were always free "to
test the formulation of the rule [in a past precedent] against the practice of the (legal)
community").
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rence of "good and enlightened men." '119 Similarly, those who accepted
the power of legislative precedent or "practice" to fix constitutional
meaning did not believe that any and every legislative action, by itself
and immediately, became "part of the [constitutional] instrument."'
2 0
Arguments based on legislative precedent almost invariably relied on the
existence of "a course of practice" approved deliberately and repeatedly
over time by the responsible organs of government 12 1 and approved by
"the uniform acquiescence of the nation."' 122 Madison's explanation of
his 1816 approval of the second bank bill and his 1817 veto of an internal
improvements bill was that the former was supported by twenty-five
years of acceptance of the legitimacy of national banks 123 which the lat-
ter did not enjoy. Argument from practice could not, in other words, be
based on "insufficient precedents,"' 124 ones ill-thought-through, short-
lived, or intermittent.
12 1
The defenders of legislative precedent as a source of constitutional
argument rejected critics' allegations that they were ignoring the textual
nature of American constitutions. Justifying an 1818 internal improve-
ments bill on the basis of earlier exercises of Congress' spending power,
Representative John C. Calhoun (at this point in his career a strong sup-
porter of federal power) denied that his reliance on a "uniform course of
legislation" replaced a Constitution of "positive and written principles"
119. WILLIAM W. HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE iv (3d ed. 1820).
120. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 185 (1804) (Lyons, P., & Carrington, JJ.).
121. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) [hereinafter
Letter from Madison to Ingersoll], in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 389, 391-92 (Marvin
Meyers ed., 1981).
122. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1325 (1818) (speech of Henry St. G. Tucker).
123. Letter from Madison to Ingersoll, supra note 121, at 393. Madison dismissed the
defeat of the first bank's renewal in 1811, which came about by Vice President George Clin-
ton's tie-breaking Senate vote against the bill on constitutional grounds, as irrelevant. See id.
The Senate was evenly divided on the renewal bill as a result of "a junction of those who
admitted the power [of Congress to establish a bank], but disapproved the plan, with those
who denied the power. On a simple question of constitutionality, there was a decided majority
in favour of it." Id.
124. Madison, supra note 29, at 388.
125. The importance of public acceptance in the maturation of legislative action into prece-
dent encouraged the opponents of controversial statutes to seek prominent means of memorial-
izing their views. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, for example, announced the state's
intention not to resist the Alien and Sedition Acts, but immediately stated that "in order that
no pretext or arguments may be drawn from a supposed acquiescence on the part of this
commonwealth in the constitutionality of these laws, and be thereby used as precedents for
similar violations of the federal compact, this commonwealth does now enter against them its
solemn protest." Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, supra note 76, at 107. Years later Henry St.
George Tucker remarked that "[i]t would be absurd to speak of the alien and sedition laws as
precedents. It would be absurd to attribute the sanctity of national acquiescence, to measures
which were received with the deep toned murmurs of national disapprobation." 32 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1326 (1818).
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with one "founded on precedents": "[H]e introduced the uniform sense
of Congress and the country (for they had not been objected to) as to our
powers; and surely, said he, they furnished better evidence of the true
interpretation of the Constitution than the most refined and subtle argu-
ments." '12 6 Madison defended the apparent inconsistency in his attitude
toward a national bank--constitutional opposition in 1791 followed by
presidential approval in 1816-as a simple consequence of his acceptance
of "the respect due to deliberate and reiterated precedents." '127 For
Madison it was "a constitutional rule of interpreting a Constitution" that
"abstract and individual opinions" of the text's meaning had to yield to
"a course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the na-
tional judgment and intention."' 28
Unless "practice" and "uniform acquiescence" could "serve as
landmarks for subsequent legislatures," Henry St. George Tucker argued
to the House of Representatives in 1818,129 debatable constitutional is-
sues could never be settled.
Do gentlemen suppose that if, which Heaven permit! this con-
federation of States shall last for a century, we shall, through-
out that period, be continually mooting Constitutional points;
holding nothing as decided; admitting no construction to have
been agreed upon; and, instead of going on with the business of
the nation, continually occupied with fighting, over and over
again, battles a thousand times won? 3 '
Discussing legislative interpretations of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, Judges Peter Lyons and Paul Carrington summarized this
widely-held view: "[w]ritten constitutions are, like other instruments,
subject to construction; and, when expounded, the exposition, after long
acquiescence, becomes, as it were, part of the instrument; and can, no
more, be departed from, than that."'
31
Some constitutionalists questioned the precedential value of particu-
lar legislative acts. Judge Spencer Roane refused to recognize Virginia
legislation on the subject of church lands as an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the religious-freedom provision of the state bill of rights because
of the legislation's "errors and inconsistency."' x32 One statute, he wrote,
126. John C. Calhoun, Speech on Internal Improvements (Feb. 4, 1817), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 398, 404 (Robert L. Meriwether ed., 1959).
127. Letter from Madison to Ingersoll, supra note 121, at 393.
128. Id. at 392-93.
129. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1325 (1818).
130. Id. at 1325-26.
131. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 185 (1804) (Lyons, P., & Carrington, JJ.).
132. Id. at 173 (Roane, J.).
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not only was "in direct hostility... with the spirit of the bill of rights,"
but even contradicted its own preamble.133 Roane's insistence that "an
act... marked with a want of knowledge of our constitution"' 34 is not a
precedent was echoed later by Henry St. George Tucker's observation
that legislation "against the clear meaning of the Constitution" was of no
authority,'35 and Marshall's suggestion in McCulloch v. Maryland 36 that
even long acquiescence could not sanctify "a bold and daring usurpa-
tion" or an act infringing "the great principles of liberty.'
137
Even the critics of invoking legislative practice in constitutional ar-
gument tended to treat judicial precedent with more respect.' 38 While
denouncing any attempt to bind the Eleventh Congress to the constitu-
tional judgments of its predecessors, Senator Clay freely conceded "the
utility of uniformity of decision" in "courts of justice" as a check on
judicial waywardness,' 39 while his ally, Representative Porter, admitted
the authority of the courts "to explain... the practical operation of each
particular law," including the immediate question of its constitutional-
ity. "° Porter denied only the power of judicial precedent to restrict sub-
sequent legislative choice: "[T]he commentaries of courts are not to
furnish the principles upon which I am afterwards to legislate."''
Others do not seem to have admitted even this restriction. In his Report
of 1800-no paean to judicial power-Madison seems to have agreed
with his opponents that "in all questions submitted to it by the forms of
the constitution," the federal judiciary was the constitutional interpreter
"in the last resort.., in relation to the authorities of the other depart-
ments of the government."' 42 Unlike state legislative resolutions, a judi-
cial decision on "the constitutionality of measures of the federal
government" is an authoritative legal declaration: it "enforces the gen-
133. Id. at 171 (Roane, J.).
134. Id. at 172 (Roane, J.).
135. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1325 (1818).
136. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
137. Id. at 401.
138. There were, of course, critics of judicial adherence to precedent. See, e.g., Anony-
mous, Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of Nature (Charleston 1783),
in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRMNG, supra note 1, at 590 ("Law from precedent should be
altogether exploded.").
139. Clay, supra note 52, at 536.
140. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 644 (1811).
141. Id.
142. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 311. Madison insisted, of course, that the judiciary's
interpretations were not final as against the views of "the parties to the constitutional com-
pact." Id. But the Report as a whole made clear that those "parties" were not the state gov-




eral will, whilst that will and that opinion continues unchanged."' 4 3
Courts in this period regularly followed both formal and informal
constitutional precedents. When the repeal of the "Midnight Judges
Act" of 1801 once again compelled the Justices of the Federal Supreme
Court to ride circuit, the renewed imposition of that duty was challenged
as unconstitutional.'" Although several of the Justices privately be-
lieved that the challenge was valid as an original matter, Justice Paterson
for the Court rejected it as coming too late: The Court's acceptance of
the requirement "for a period of several years, commencing with the or-
ganization of the judicial system . . . has indeed fixed the construc-
tion."' 45  Writing about the Virginia Constitution, Judge Tucker
explained that "the duty of expounding [the law, including the constitu-
tion] must be exclusively vested in the judiciary"'" and that as a conse-
quence "the decisions of the supreme court of appeals in this
commonwealth, upon any question [concerning] the operation or con-
struction... of the constitution of this commonwealth, are to be resorted
to by all other courts, as expounding, in their truest sense, the laws of the
land."" The preface to the reports of John Marshall's opinions on cir-
cuit stated that it fell to Marshall to "develope, define, and establish, the
true and fundamental powers and character of our incomparable govern-
ment." The principles Marshall's decisions applied to the Constitution
"thus bec[ame] part of itself, and necessary to its healthful, durable and
consistent action."
148
As with legislative precedents, the authority of judicial precedent
was not without its limits. Few constitutionalists would have disagreed
with Roane's general comment in 1815 that a precedent that "has never
received the solemn and deliberate discussion and decision" of a court
143. Id. at 402-03.
144. Following the Republican victories in the 1800 election, the lame duck Federalist ma-
jority in Congress enacted a sweeping reform of the federal judicial system. The Judiciary Act
of 1801 replaced the cumbersome system of circuit courts made up of district judges and
Supreme Court Justices on circuit with six new courts staffed primarily by sixteen resident
circuit judges; the Act also granted these courts general federal question jurisdiction. Judici-
ary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 90-92 (repealed 1802). From a modem perspective, the Act's
provisions appear sensible-indeed, the Act's remodelling of the judiciary substantially paral-
leled the modem system, but at the time most Republicans were enraged, particularly because
outgoing President John Adams attempted to fill the new judgeships with Federalist appoin-
tees (the so-called midnight judges). The new Republican congressional majority therefore
repealed most of the 1801 Act's reforms. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132; Act of April
29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156.
145. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
146. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (Va. Cas.) 20, 79 (1793) (Tucker, J.).
147. Id. at 93.
148. Joseph Hopkinson, Memoir of John Marshall, in 1 BROCKENBROUGH'S REPORTS xiii
(1837).
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would be of little independent value. 149 Reviewing and rejecting Roane's
conclusion, Justice Story was careful to rest his judgment "upon a foun-
dation of authority" consisting not only of "judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court through so long a period," but also of the "contempora-
neous exposition" of the First Congress that vested the jurisdiction in the
Court and of the "acquiescence of enlightened state courts." 150 Perhaps
because of the relatively small volume of court decisions on constitu-
tional matters in this period, criticism of the authority of judicial prece-
dent tended to be focused not on its validity in arguments before courts,
but on attempts to impose judicial interpretations on other constitutional
actors. Thus the question of the sources of constitutional argument
blended into a second important theme, that of the authority of the
interpreter.
II. THE Locus OF INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
During his struggle to impose a royalist vision of the English legal
order on the common-law courts, King James I angrily rejected the claim
of the courts to exclusive authority to "interpret" the laws of the realm.
"If the Judges interprete the lawes themselves and suffer none else to
interprete," the King remarked, "then they may easily make of the laws
shipmens hose."1 51 King James's remark reflected his awareness of a
characteristic not only of early Stuart England but of all Western legal
orders: interpretive authority is a potent source of political power, and
the final or exclusive possession of that authority identifies a major center
of power in the legal order. Americans of the founding era were well
aware of King James's insight, and a major theme in early constitutional
debate concerned rival claims of interpretive authority. Various people
during the period claimed major roles in constitutional interpretation for
Congress, the President, the federal courts, the state legislatures, the state
courts, and state conventions; the two primary disputes were over the
finality of judicial interpretation, and the identity of ultimate interpretive
authority in the federal Union.
149. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 51 (1815) (Roane, J.); see also Professor Pos-
tema's important work on the "traditionary" understanding of precedent, supra note 118, at 1-
29 (discussing the role of precedent in common-law-based legal systems).
150. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 352. Roane and Story held identical views of the au-
thority of precedent, and described that common view in their opinions in the Martin litigation
in almost identical language: Then as now, agreement on the importance of stare decisis did
not guarantee agreement on its application.
151. HOWARD NENNs, BY COLOUR OF LAW 72 (1977).
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A. Legislatures as Constitutional Interpreters
Americans generally agreed that both federal and state legislatures
enjoyed the power, and were subject to the obligation, to interpret the
constitutions under which they were acting. Occasionally, particularly in
the First Congress, legislators expressed doubts about their ability or au-
thority to interpret constitutional language. During the 1789 debate over
whether to grant the President sole authority to remove officers ap-
pointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, Representative Alex-
ander White observed that "it seems a difficult point to determine
whether he has or has not this power by the Constitution."1"2 Under
such circumstances White preferred "to leave the construction to [the
President] ... I will venture to say, the occasion for the exercise of it will
be a better comment on the Constitution than any we can give." '153
Other Congressmen insisted that interpretation was an exclusively
judicial task. As Madison paraphrased this position, it was the claim
"that the legislature itself has no right to expound the Constitution; that
wherever its meaning is doubtful, you must leave it to take its course
until the Judiciary is called upon to declare its meaning."1 5 ' Madison
himself was not hostile to the courts' interpretive authority: "I acknowl-
edge, in the ordinary course of Government, that the exposition of the
laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary." ' 5 But, Madison
insisted, the courts' ordinary or primary role in interpretation was not an
exclusive one. "It is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this
branch of [g]overnment as to any other," he reminded the House, "that
the Constitution should be preserved entire." '56 He saw no reason, in
principle or in constitutional text, why "it will be less safe, that the expo-
sition should issue from the Legislative authority than any other." '57 In
any event, as Fisher Ames told the House of Representatives in 1791,
legislative interpretation was unavoidable because the formulation of leg-
islation under a constitution defining legislative power almost always in-
volved decisions as to the constitution's meaning: "[W]e have scarcely
made a law in which we have not exercised our discretion with regard to
the true intent of the Constitution." '158 State legislatures, most of which
were not expressly limited to a set of enumerated powers, found occasion
to construe the procedural provisions of their constitutions as well as
152. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 516 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
153. Id.




158. Ames, supra note 37, at 853-54.
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their state bills of rights.159
For Congress at least, the legislative role in proposing constitutional
amendments often was seen as a special subset of the general legislative
duty to interpret the Constitution. James Madison, for example, regu-
larly insisted that the Federal Bill of Rights consisted of "explanatory
amendments" 1" meant only to declare authoritatively the meaning of
the 1787 Constitution.161 Thomas M'Kean similarly referred to the Elev-
enth Amendment as a "legislative declaration of the meaning of the con-
stitution." '162 Jefferson welcomed both the passage of an 1817
improvements bill and Madison's veto of it because he believed (mistak-
enly) that those events would lead to a constitutional amendment grant-
ing Congress the requisite power and "settl[ing] forever the meaning" of
the words "provide for the common Defence and General welfare" in
Article I, section 8.163 Henry St. George Tucker, on the other hand,
rejected the call for an internal improvements amendment precisely be-
cause he understood the "general welfare" language differently from Jef-
ferson and thus believed Congress already possessed the power to fund
internal improvements. Such an "unnecessary" amendment, Tucker in-
sisted, "only serves to narrow and circumscribe the construction of the
instrument, and, whilst it gives one power, furnishes a weapon by which
ten more may be wrested from us."''
B. The President and Constitutional Interpretation
Since the Constitution's ratification the Presidents also regarded
themselves as obliged and entitled to interpret it. George Washington,
for example, withdrew his original nomination of William Paterson to be
a justice of the Supreme Court when it was pointed out to Washington
that Paterson's uncompleted term in office as a United States Senator
encompassed the period in which Congress had created the position of
associate justice. Since Article One, section 6 forbids the appointment of
any member of Congress "during the Time for which he was elected...
to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created... during such time," Washington withdrew the nom-
159. The statute that the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld in Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6
Call) 113 (1904), and that the United States Supreme Court held void in Terrett v. Taylor, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815), was itself the Virginia legislature's express exercise of the authority
to interpret the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
160. Madison, supra note 33, at 375.
161. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 340.
162. Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Dall. 467, 474 (Pa. 1798).
163. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 15 JEFFERSON
WRrrINGS, supra note 36, at 131, 133.
164. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1120 (1818).
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ination, informing the Senate that "I think it my duty, therefore, to de-
clare that I deem the nomination to have been null by the
Constitution."' 165 Washington also explained one of his two vetoes on
constitutional grounds. 1 6 6 Most famous, of course, was Washington's
concern over whether to sign the national bank bill, a concern that led
him to request written opinions as to the bill's constitutionality from
three members of his cabinet. In responding, all three assumed that the
President legitimately might employ the veto to give effect to his consti-
tutional views, and Jefferson described the very purpose of the veto
power as "the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the
invasions of the legislature" into the rights of the executive, the judiciary,
and the states, 167 a view shared by James Kent. 168 Neither John Adams
nor Jefferson exercised the veto, but Madison's seven vetoes included sev-
eral based on constitutional objections to legislation.
169
During this period, the most dramatic confrontation between the
Congress and the President over claims to interpretive authority oc-
curred in 1796, when Washington requested that the Congress imple-
ment the Jay Treaty with Britain by appropriate legislation. 17 0 When the
House of Representatives requested Washington to transmit to it certain
secret documentation concerning the treaty so as to fulfill its constitu-
tional duty of deliberation with regard to the proposed legislation, Wash-
ington refused. The President justified his refusal to acquiesce in the
House's constitutionally based demand as a matter of "[a] just regard to
the Constitution," which he interpreted differently from the House.171 In
turn the House majority restated its own views of the constitutional is-
sue, although no further attempt was made to secure the documents.
165. Message from George Washington to the Senate (Feb. 28, 1793), in 1 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 29, at 137, 137.
166. George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 29, at 124, 124.
167. Bank Opinion, supra note 35, at 420-21.
168. Kent, supra note 27, at 941-43.
169. See, eg., James Madison, Veto Messages (Feb. 21, 1811 & Feb. 28, 1811), in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 29, at 489-90 (vetoing two bills on first amendment
grounds).
170. In 1794, Washington appointed Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate an end to British
attacks on American shipping and British withdrawal from posts they were holding in the
Northwest Territory. The treaty Jay ultimately negotiated and signed, 8 Stat. 116 (1795),
obtained those goals but made various concessions to the British that proved highly unpopular.
A hostile majority in the House of Representatives attempted to block implementation of the
treaty by threatening a refusal to appropriate funds to implement it. See JERALD A. COMBS,
THE JAY TREATY 159-88 (1970) (discussing the debate over ratification and implementation of
the treaty).
171. George Washington, Message to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796),
in 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 2-5 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
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The dispute highlighted the consequences of having no final interpreter-
Washington's views prevailed in the practical sense that the House found
no way to compel him to adopt its opinion and release the documents,
and ultimately felt obliged to implement the Jay Treaty. But the inter-
pretive questions themselves were not resolved.
The potential problem of legislative-executive conflict over the
United States Constitution's meaning was raised by the Jay Treaty affair,
but for the most part such conflict was not a major element of the consti-
tutional history of the period. Although the spectre of governmental pa-
ralysis in the case of severe and unresolved constitutional disagreement
occasionally was raised, 172 it did not in fact occur. In contrast, the ques-
tions of who possessed interpretive authority in the federal system and of
the relationship between federal power and state autonomy were among
the most widely canvassed issues of the era.
C. The Debate Over Federal and State Interpretive Authority
Nationalists consistently maintained that both reason and text sup-
ported their ascription to the federal government, and specifically to the
federal courts, of final interpretive authority on questions of federalism.
In 1799, the Massachusetts Senate observed that federal powers were
"entrusted" to the national authorities "by the people" and that state
interference with federal legislation-what the Senate described as a state
opposing "her force and will to those of the nation"-would reduce the
Constitution itself "to a mere cypher, to the form and pageantry of au-
thority, without the energy of power." 17 Legal questions involving the
proper construction of the Constitution, the Senate stated, "are exclu-
sively vested by the people in the judicial courts of the United States."
' 17 4
As Justice Story asserted in 1815, nationalists viewed the supremacy of
the Constitution as inextricably linked to the "the paramount authority
of the United States" as a government.1 75 To make the former a reality,
the latter had to be granted as well. "[S]tates as States," Clay told the
United States Senate in 1818, "have no right to oppose the execution of
the powers which the general government asserts";1 76 the institution with
172. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 699-700 (1796) (speech of William Vans Murray).
173. Massachusetts Resolutions in Reply to Virginia (adopted on Feb. 13, 1799), reprinted
in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 18, 19 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1970) [herein-
after STATE DOCUMENTS].
174. Id. at 18.
175. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816).
176. Henry Clay, Speech on Internal Improvements (Mar. 13, 1818), in 2 CLAY PAPERS,
supra note 52, at 467, 472.
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legitimate interpretive authority to judge and limit the assertion of these
powers was itself "general"r-the federal judiciary.
The exercise of federal power during the late 1790s in accord with a
nationalist interpretation of the Constitution provoked in its turn a vigor-
ous assertion of the states' role in constitutional interpretation. Penn-
sylvania Chief Justice Thomas M'Kean in his 1798 opinion, Respublica v.
Cobbett, denied that there was any final interpretive authority on dis-
puted issues of federalism and national power short of the people: "If a
state should differ with the United States about the construction of [the
Constitution], there is no common umpire but the people, who should
adjust the affair by making amendments in the constitutional way, or
suffer from the defect." 177 The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798 arguably appeared to reject both the nationalist view and M'Kean's
"no-umpire" theory by locating final interpretive authority in "each
party [state]"' 178 or in "the states." 179 The nullifiers of the late 1820s and
1830s were to seize upon this language as locating ultimate constitutional
authority in the individual state convention (subject to Article V's
amendment process),180 but the original meaning of the two sets of Reso-
lutions was in fact much more ambiguous.
In Jefferson's original draft of the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions, he
wrote that each state had "a natural right in cases not within the com-
pact (casus non foederis) to nullify of their own authority, all assumptions
of power by others within their limits,"'' an assertion that the legisla-
ture omitted before adopting the Resolutions. As Madison repeatedly
pointed out during the nullification crisis, however, Jefferson's careful
use of the phrases "natural right" and "cases not within the compact"
seemed to point not to a legal power to interpret the Constitution but to
the ultimate remedy of revolution "against insupportable oppression."'1
82
177. Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Dall. 467, 473 (Pa. 1798).
178. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in THE POLITCAL WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
157 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955).
179. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798 [hereinafter Virginia Resolutions], in 17
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 22, at 189.
180. Debate over the legitimacy of protective tariffs culminated in the Nullification Crisis
of 1828-1833, during which the state of South Carolina purported to "nullify" federal legisla-
tion, and President Andrew Jackson threatened to enforce federal law by force. The propo-
nents of an individual state's authority to nullify national legislation it considered
unconstitutional claimed that they were only carrying out the logic of the "principles of'98," a
claim Madison and others hotly disputed. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK 1-12
(1987) (discussing the intellectual origins of the nullification crisis).
181. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, in 7 JEFFERSON WRMINGS,
supra note 36, at 298, 301.
182. James Madison, Notes on Nullification (1835-36), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER,
supra note 121, at 428-29 n.3. On Madison's criticism of the nullifiers' invocation of Jefferson,
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Although the anonymously drafted Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 did
use the term "nullification," the legislature avoided any implication that
the Resolutions themselves had legal force by speaking of state action in
the plural, by stating that "this commonwealth, as a party to the federal
compact, will bow to the laws of the Union," and by implying that "its
solemn protest" was the opposition "in a constitutional manner" which it
stated it was carrying out.183
In the Report of 1800 Madison so downplayed the Virginia Resolu-
tions' assertion of state interpretive authority that nationalist critic Alex-
ander Addison regarded the Report's theoretical position in the matter as
indistinguishable from the nationalist view. 84 The "states" that possess
final interpretive power, the Report explained, were "the people compos-
ing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity" rather
than the state governments or even the states as societies "organized into
those particular governments." '  The power of "interposition"
Madison mentioned in the Report was, it seems, simply a restatement of
"the fundamental principle on which our independence itself was de-
clared," that "the people" are sovereign "over constitutions,"18 a posi-
tion no nationalist would have denied. Nationalist James Bayard, for
example, asked rhetorically in Congress in 1802 "if the power to decide
upon the validity of our laws resides with the people? Gentlemen cannot
deny this right to the people. I admit that they possess it."P
187
The exercise of interpretive authority by state legislatures during
this era was confined to two closely related modes: the enunciation of
respectable opinion intended to sway the views of others, and the attempt
to deny precedential status to disputed federal actions. Madison de-
scribed the Virginia Resolutions as "expressions of opinion, unaccompa-
nied with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by
exciting reflection" and producing "a change in [Congress' or the judici-
ary's] expression of the general will."18 The 1799 Kentucky legislature
see ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 287-88
(1950).
183. Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, supra note 76, at 107.
184. Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assem-
bly (Philadelphia 1800), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING, supra note 1, at 1055, 1057-60.
Addison's complaint at this point with the Report was that the Resolutions it purported to
justify had asserted "a right of the Legislative of Virginia to judge of the violation of the
compact," when by the Report's own reasoning the Resolutions were nothing more than the
"opinion as individuals" of the state legislators. Id. at 1058, 1059.
185. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 309.
186. Id. at 311-12.
187. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 646 (1802).
188. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 348.
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described its "solemn protest" as intended to prevent future interpreters
from drawing any conclusions from "a supposed acquiescence on the
part of this commonwealth in the constitutionality" of the Alien and Se-
dition Acts. 189 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Resolutions of 1811 against a
renewal of the national bank bill were directed to the state's delegation in
Congress, instructing its senators and representatives "to use every exer-
tion in their power" to defeat renewal.1 90 Despite the sometimes heated
rhetoric found in state legislative discussions of federal behavior, those
discussions seldom if ever went beyond the expression of opinion or a call
for amendments to the Constitution.
The primary function of asserting state interpretive authority in the
founding era was negative, the denial of finality to federal interpretations.
This was perhaps clearest in Hunter v. Martin, where the 'Virginia Court
of Appeals relied on its own interpretation of the United States Constitu-
tion in denying the Federal Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review state
judgments. Judge William Cabell described the state court's position as
nothing more than a refusal to equate obedience to the Constitution with
"a subjection to the Federal Courts."' 91 Neither Cabell nor any of his
colleagues claimed that the federal judges were bound to accept the state
court's constructions of the Constitution; they simply asserted their own
independent judgment in constitutional interpretation, while leaving to
"the impartial investigation" of the people the final decision as to "the
constitutionality of Federal adjudications."' 92
D. The Judicial Power "to expound what the law is" 193
Alongside the wide-spread respect accorded legislative interpreta-
tions and the peculiarly nationalist and states-rights predilections for, re-
spectively, presidential and "state" constructions of the Federal
Constitution, there was general agreement, over a broad range of polit-
ical and constitutional opinion, about the special responsibility of the ju-
diciary in constitutional interpretation. Upholding the power of judicial
review, the great state sovereignty judge Spencer Roane stated that it was
"the province of the judiciary to expound the laws" and in doing so to
expound "that law which is of the highest authority of any."'194 The
great nationalist judge and scholar James Kent, writing almost simulta-
189. Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, supra note 76, at 107.
190. Pennsylvania General Assembly, Resolutions Against the Bank (Jan. 11, 1811), in
STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 173, at 52, 53.
191. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 11 (1815).
192. Id. at 23 (Brooke, J.).
193. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (1793) (Tucker, J.).
194. Id. at 38 (Roane, J.).
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neously, agreed: "[T]he interpretation or construction of the Constitu-
tion is as much a JUDICIAL act, and requires the exercise of the same
LEGAL DISCRETION, as the interpretation or construction of a
Law." '195 "I consider the Courts of Justice," Kent concluded, "as the
proper and intended Guardians of our limited Constitutions, against the
factions and encroachments of the Legislative Body." 196
Respect for the interpretive authority of the courts was often put in
the strongest terms. St. George Tucker asserted that the task of "ex-
pound[ing] what the law is" was "the duty and office of the judiciary"
and that "the duty of expounding must be exclusively vested in the judi-
ciary.91 97 Writing more generally of the judicial power to interpret all
laws, Justice William Johnson stated that "[o]f these laws the courts are
the constitutional expositors; and every department of government must
submit to their exposition; for laws have no legal meaning but what is
given them by the courts to whose exposition they are submitted." '
The same was true, Justice John Marshall wrote, of the great unwritten
constitutional principle of respect for vested rights: "The question
whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be
tried by the judicial authority."1 99 The "decision of all cases" involving
the construction of the Federal Constitution and laws, the Massachusetts
Senate stated in 1799, was "exclusively vested by the people in the courts
of the United States." 2" The United States Supreme Court's "exposition
of the constitution, laws, [and] treaties of the United States," Chief Jus-
tice Marshall wrote, is that "which must ultimately prevail." ''
The authoritativeness of judicial interpretation was sometimes based
on the intrinsic "nature" of such questions, as suggested by Kent and
Marshall's statements. At other times the courts' interpretive powers de-
rived from the need to give practical meaning to the American constitu-
tions' attempt to limit governmental power. "If you mean to have a
constitution," Congressman Bayard told his colleagues, "you must dis-
cover a power to which the acknowledged right is attached of pronounc-
ing the invalidity of the acts of the legislature which contravene the
instrument.""2 2 "To maintain, therefore, the Constitution, the judges are
195. Kent, supra note 27, at 942.
196. Id at 944.
197. Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78-79 (Tucker, J.).
198. William Johnson, Public Statement of August 26, 1808, in 1 THE GROWTH OF PRESI-
DENTIAL POWER 563-72 (William M. Goldsmith ed., 1974).
199. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803).
200. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 173, at 18.
201. Letter from John Marshall to Dudley Chase (Feb. 2, 1817), in JOHN E. OSTER, THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 80, 81 (1914).
202. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1802).
[Vol. 71
POLITICAL GRAMMAR
a check upon the legislature."2 3 The Federalist Bayard agreed with the
Republican Roane that, in the latter's words, the judiciary is "not only
the proper, but a perfectly disinterested tribunal" whenever a claim is
raised that the constitution has been violated."' As Kent explained,
"the efficacy" of constitutional limitations "would be totally lost ... if
the Legislature was left the ultimate Judge of the nature and extent of the
[constitutional] barriers."205 The dangers of factional strmggle and of
"considerations of temporary expediency" rendered the legislature inca-
pable of policing its own constitutional limitations. "The Courts of Jus-
tice which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from
the baneful influence of Faction" were, in Kent's view, "the most proper
power in the Government... to maintain the Authority of the Constitu-
tion."20 6 Roane made a similar point in the language of separation of
powers rather than that of checks and balances: "[E]very legislative ex-
position," he wrote, "contravenes that principle requiring a separation of
the legislative and judicial departments" by uniting "the pDwers of pass-
ing and executing laws in the same persons [which is] no contemptible
definition of despotism. ' 20 7 As a consequence, "a legislative construction
of the law and constitution.., however respectable.., must yield to that
of the judiciary." 2 8 Similarly, Justice Story wrote that "[w]hatever
weight" a legislative interpretation "might properly have as the opinion
of wise and learned men, as a declaration of what the law has been or is,
it can have no decisive authority." 20 9
James Madison's view of the authority of judicial interpretation is
particularly instructive, because Madison firmly believed in an active in-
terpretive role for both the executive and the legislative branches, as well
as (in the federal context) some final, if ambiguous, place for "state" in-
terpretation. When the Massachusetts Senate accused the Virginia legis-
lature of usurping the interpretive authority of the federal courts,
Madison's Report of 1800 responded first by pointing out that not all
"instances of usurped power" could eventuate in justiciable cases, and
then by defining the Virginia legislature's assertion of "state" interpretive
power as concerned with "those great and extraordinary cases in which
all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infrac-
203. Id.
204. Kamnper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 39 (Gen. Ct. 1793) (Roane, J.).
205. Kent, supra note 27, at 942.
206. Id.
207. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113, 176 (1804).
208. Id. at 172-73.
209. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51 (1815).
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tions." 210 Somewhat equivocally, Madison continued by stating that the
finality of federal judicial interpretation "must necessarily be deemed the
last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the [federal]
government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitu-
tional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments
hold their delegated trusts."2"1 Much later in the Report, however,
Madison returned to the subject. There he carefully differentiated as
"expressions of opinions" the "declarations" of citizens or legislatures
from the enforceable "expositions of the judiciary": The latter, he stated,
"enforce[ ] the general will" in accordance with the judiciary's opinion of
that will as embodied in the Constitution.2"2 As President, Madison took
a similar position. In response to the Pennsylvania Governor's call for
assistance in resisting what both the Governor and the state legislature
viewed as an unconstitutional invasion of state autonomy by the Supreme
Court, Madison refused even to discuss the merits of the constitutional
question. Instead, Madison stressed his duty as President "to carry into
effect any such decree" and strongly implied the existence of a duty on
the state's part to accept the Court's decision.2" 3
The widely held view that judicial interpretation was, short of direct
action by the people, the primary or even final authority on constitu-
tional questions was not without its critics. The 1802 struggle in Con-
gress over the bill to repeal the Midnight Judges Act provoked a direct
denial by a few Republicans of the power of judicial review, and conse-
quently of judicial interpretive power.214 The Republican political lead-
ership, in contrast, accepted the legitimacy of some form of judicial
review while disliking the contemporary Federalist judiciary.215 As Jef-
ferson wrote to Abigail Adams two years later, he did not question the
210. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 311.
211. Id On the separate question of the relative authority of the interpretations of federal
and state institutions, Madison's consistent position was that state governmental actors were
bound by the constitutional decisions of the federal judiciary. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 71-72 (1992).
212. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 348.
213. Letter from James Madison to Simon Snyder (Apr. 13, 1809), in I THE PAPERS Of
JAMES MADISON (PRESIDENTIAL SERIES) 114 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1984).
214. Charles Warren showed that this attack on the legitimacy of judicial review was the
product not of constitutional principle but of specific regional concerns over the effect of fed-
eral court decisions on land title disputes in Virginia and Kentucky. See 1 CHARLES WAR-
REN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 219-22 (rev. ed. 1928).
215. The Republican press, for example, did not criticize the Supreme Court's assertion of
the power of judicial review in Marbury. Id. at 248-52. Warren concluded that "practically
the only published attack on [the judicial review] portion of Marshall's opinion" was a series of
letters printed by a Federalist newspaper that prefaced them with the remark that in the edi-




courts' "right to decide what laws are constitutional and what not," but
only the claim that they could do so "not only for themselves in their
own sphere of action but for the legislature and executive also in their
own spheres." '216 Jefferson's view was that every branch was "equally
independent in the sphere of action assigned to them"; as a consequence
he accepted as legitimate, for example, both the judiciary's enforcement
of the Sedition Act, because it believed it constitutional, and his own
pardon of those convicted under the Act, because he thought it unconsti-
tutional.2 17 Jefferson's theory of co-ordinate interpretive authorities was
echoed on later occasions,218 but most of Jefferson's fellow Republicans
seem to have accepted Madison's less conflict-ridden vision of interpre-
tive authority, one in which legislative and executive opinion played ap-
propriate roles without challenging the primacy of judicial construction
in "the ordinary course of Government."
III. THE IDENTITY OF THE SOVEREIGN
When Alexander Hamilton ridiculed the notion that the United
States might "furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without
sovereignty," '219 he was expressing a widely held sense that "sovereignty"
was an unavoidable concept in political thought. And yet, when Justice
James Wilson asked, "Who, or what, is a sovereignty? What is his or its
sovereignty? On this subject, the errors and the mazes are endless and
inexplicable,"22 he, too, captured a central feature of the era's talk about
"sovereignty." While not all of Wilson's contemporaries shared his dis-
like for the terms, few of them can have doubted that "sovereign" and
"sovereignty" were concepts as contested and confusing as they were
common in American political debate. The language itself was inherited
from the British colonial past. In the English Tory tradition, "the sover-
eign" primarily referred to the "supreme lord" (according to Dr. John-
son's definition),221 that is, in the British context, to the King. The term
216. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49-53 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., Memorial ed.
1904).
217. Id.
218. For example, in 1811, Peter Porter conceded that he accepted the de facto power of
the judiciary to interpret the Constitution through its role in administering "the practical oper-
ation of each particular law," but rejected "the commentaries of courts" as a guide for future
legislation. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 644 (1811).
219. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 98.
220. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
221. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE S.V. "sovereign"
(1755).
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"sovereignty" denoted the King's "attribute of ... pre-eminence. ' 222
From the monarch's personal sovereignty English lawyers derived such
characteristics as his immunity from compulsive suit and the legal impos-
sibility of ascribing to him any wrong.223 Using the term in a broader
sense, Blackstone and many others defined "sovereign power" as "the
making of laws," possession of which obliges "all others [to] conform to,
and be directed by it. '224 In this sense of ultimate legislative power, "the
sovereignty of the British constitution," post-1688 lawyers agreed, was
"lodged" in the composite body of Parliament consisting of King, Lords,
and Commons.225
English "Country" thinkers and pre-Revolutionary American
Whigs226 tended to use the language of sovereignty in a different manner,
to designate the ultimate location of political authority in the people
rather than in their royal or parliamentary agents. James Otis' 1764
pamphlet, The Rights of British Colonies Asserted and Proved, for exam-
ple, conceded the necessity of sovereign power in every polity: "[Ain
original supreme Sovereign, absolute and uncontrollable, earthly power
must exist in and preside over every society." But for Otis, sovereignty in
this proper sense could only rest "originally and ultimately in the people"
who for convenience's sake then delegate their authority, in trust, to the
actual executive and legislative powers of the state.227
American political discussion after independence was influenced
both by the legal definitions of sovereignty and by Whig notions about
the popular foundations of legitimate government. A central issue in this
early period was identifying what role these various ideas should play in
the new American constitutional order. People across the range of polit-
ical opinion shared Whig language about "the people": Ultra-nationalist
John Jay wrote that "[the people] are truly the sovereign of the coun-
222. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *234.
223. Id. at *236-37.
224. Id. at *49.
225. Id. at *51.
226. During the early 1700s, a school of political thought arose in England that was op-
posed to the politicians of "the Court," who dominated English political life for most of the
century. This "Country" school or ideology seems to have influenced heavily the views of the
late-colonial Whigs (or Patriots) in America who eventually led the Revolution. "Country"
themes can also be traced in Anti-federalist rhetoric during the ratification period and in the
thought of the Republicans in the 1790s. See generally LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN
PERSUASION: EvoLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978) (discussing links between the
"Country" ideology, ratification-era Antifederalism, and the Republican party of the 1790s).
227. James Otis, The Right of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in POLITICAL




try"'2 2 8 at almost the same time Anti-federalist Spencer Roane defined
"the people of this country" as "the only sovereign power." 2 29 Ameri-
cans of disparate views also shared the Blackstonian use of "sover-
eign(ty)" in connection with the organs of government.2 30  Federalist
John Marshall, for example, could refer to the legislature of Georgia as
"the supreme sovereign power of a state,"23' as easily as states rights
jurist Robert White would speak of "the rights, Sovereignty, and Inde-
pendence of the respective State Governments. 2 32 But rhetorical simi-
larities masked and sometimes confused profound constitutional
disagreement. By "the people," a nationalist like Jay meant Americans
as a whole, while Roane was referring to Virginians as a distinct political
community. Marshall's ascription of "sovereignty" to a state legislature
merely echoed Blackstone's near-equation of "sovereign" and "legisla-
tive," but White meant to invoke strong notions of the states' judicial and
legislative autonomy from federal interference. There was, in fact, no
agreed-upon definition of "sovereignty" and no uncontroversial identifi-
cation of its location in the American constitutional order. The term was
both central to the founding era's political grammar and essentially
ambiguous.
233
A. The Political System of "Divided Sovereignty"
The varying meanings of "sovereignty" in this period may be
grouped into four categories. The earliest, and most persistent, was the
language of divided sovereignty. Despite the view, widespread during
1787 and 1788, that sovereignty was necessarily indivisible and thus that
either the states or the nation had to be sovereign, soon after 1789 it
became common to assert, as Hamilton wrote in 1791, that "the powers
of sovereignty are in this country divided between the National and State
Governments. '2 34  Constitutional arguments often referred in parallel
fashion to "the sovereignty of the nation" and the "residuary sovereignty
of each State,12 35 or to "the divided sovereignty ' 2 36 of the Union.
The language of divided sovereignty often seems simply to have been
228. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
229. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 36 (Gen. Ct. 1793) (Roane, J.).
230. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
231. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
232. Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 35 (1815).
233. Confusion and disagreement over the use of sovereignty language also pervaded the
debates about the creation and ratification of the federal Constitution. See H. Jefferson Powell,
The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1513, 1524-29 (1987).
234. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 98.
235. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
236. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 8 (1815) (Cabell, J.).
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a means of recognizing verbally the existence of separate and complete
governmental structures with deliberative and legislative powers both in
the several states and on the federal level: When Henry Clay described
the United States as a combination of "twenty local sovereignties" with
parochial and "municipal" concerns and "one great sovereignty" en-
trusted with external and commercial responsibilities, 37 the use of "sov-
ereignty" rather than "government" or "legislature" was little more than
a rhetorical flourish. In the 1805 case of Hepburn v. Ellzey,2 38 E. J. Lee's
argument for the plaintiff involved a denial that the states were radically
distinct legally from other subnatural polities such as the District of Co-
lumbia, while Charles Lee's opposing position insisted on the unique con-
stitutional role of the states. The former therefore stressed that the states
lacked "certain rights of sovereignty, 2 39 while the latter stressed the
states' "peculiar" role in the Union. For neither attorney, however, was
some concrete concept of "sovereignty" crucial to his argument, and
both probably would have subscribed to Charles Lee's remark that "[t]he
states are not absolutely sovereigns, but (if I may use the expression) they
are demi-sovereigns. "I'
The use of divided sovereignty talk was not always this protean in
application; at times it served to designate the existence of decisional au-
tonomy and discretion, what E. J. Lee described in 1805 as "the free
exercise of all the rights of sovereignty uncontrolled by any other
power.""24 Hamilton's 1791 bank opinion242 accepted the sovereignty of
both state and federal governments as to their respective spheres of activ-
ity in order to claim for Congress the power to exercise discretion in its
choice of means to pursue its constitutional ends.243 Congress' decisions
about legislative means thus shared in the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion's designation of legitimate legislative ends. 2" Judge Cabell's rejec-
tion of Federal Supreme Court jurisdiction over state court decisions
used similar logic to reach a politically contrary result. Given the "resid-
uary sovereignty of the states," neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
could compel state courts to conform their interpretations of the United
States Constitution to the Court's. To admit such a power would be to
deny the state judges' inherent obligation and ability to apply law "ac-
237. Clay, supra note 52, at 449.
238. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804).
239. Id. at 446 (argument of counsel).
240. Id. at 449 (argument of counsel).
241. Id. at 446 (argument of counsel).
242. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
243. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 98.
244. Id. at 107.
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cording to their own judgments." 245 Lower courts within a single sover-
eignty, Cabell admitted, were required to follow the decisions of the
sovereignty's highest court; the very point of calling the states sovereign
was to deny that state and federal courts were instruments of the same
sovereignty. 2 6 Cabell's fellow states-rights Virginian Robert White used
divided sovereignty language in an effort to demonstrate that Congress
could not confer jurisdiction over a federal offense on a state court: Con-
gress' attempt to do so was unconstitutional both because it invaded the
state's sovereign autonomy and because it improperly derogated from the
Union's own sovereignty, "an important part" of which was "a fight to
expound its Laws" in its own courts. 47 "Sovereignty" as Hamilton,
Cabell, White, and others sometimes used it, thus was a concept inti-
mately connected with the question of discretion, which will be discussed
below.
B. The Sovereignty of the Nation
The best-known use of the language of sovereignty had to do with
identifying the fundamental nature of the political and constitutional or-
der. On at least two important occasions in the 1790s, attempts were
made to capture the language of sovereignty as a means of expressing a
particular vision of the United States Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court's first great case, Chisholm v. Georgia,24 involved a pri-
vate party's claim that a state could be subjected to national judicial
power without its consent.2 49 The case thus unavoidably posed for the
Court the question of the identity of the sovereign in the federal constitu-
tional order. Georgia's justification for its refusal to recognize the
Court's jurisdiction-a justification articulated only after the fact since
the state declined even to argue the point before the Court2 -50-rested on
the legal rule found in Blackstone and elsewhere that the sovereign could
not be sued without his (or its) consent. The rule's viability in a federal
court system had been discussed during the ratification campaign of
1787-88, and Hamilton, among other supporters of the Constitution, had
intimated that the states would retain, "as one of the attributes of sover-
245. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 11 (1815) (Cabell, J.).
246. Id. at 8-9.
247. Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 35 (1815).
248. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
249. Id at 453 (Wilson, J.).
250. Governor Edward Telfair, Message to the Georgia Legislature (Nov. 4, 1793), in
STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 173, at 8-9; An Act Declaratory of Certain Parts of the Re-
tained Sovereignty of the State of Georgia (passed by the State House of Representatives, Nov.
21, 1973), in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 173, at 9-11.
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eignty," their immunity from suit under the proposed Constitution.25 1
Georgia's implied position thus enjoyed significant support from the his-
tory of the Constitution's origins.
Attorney General Randolph, the plaintiff's counsel in Chisholm, ar-
gued to the Court that a variety of considerations supported the claim
that an unconsenting state was subject to compulsory federal jurisdiction.
Randolph's primary argument was strictly textual: Article III extended
federal jurisdiction to controversies "between a state and citizens of an-
other state." No one would doubt, Randolph observed, that under such
language Georgia constitutionally could sue Chisholm (a South Carolin-
ian) in federal court; both logic and the grammar of the clauses in Article
III strongly suggested that the reverse was true as well. 2 2 Randolph
insisted that the states' sovereign status, which he conceded,2"3 did not
contradict this textual argument. Precisely as sovereigns, "with the free
will, arising from absolute independence, '254 the states had formed a fed-
eral union that limited their powers and independence both by the dele-
gation of authority to the federal government and by implicit
prohibitions on state action. Such undeniable "diminutions of sover-
eignty" proved, in Randolph's opinion, that "there is nothing in the na-
ture of sovereignties, combined as those of America are, to prevent the
words of the constitution [apparently subjecting states to suit] ... from
receiving an easy and usual construction.
255
Randolph's argument attempted to combine a common nationalist
rhetorical strategy, one that identified the states as (partially) sovereign
while insisting that on the issue at hand, state sovereignty had been
abridged by the states' own action in adopting the Constitution.2 56 Two
members of the Supreme Court majority that upheld Chisholm's right to
sue Georgia adopted a different approach, one that recast the entire dis-
cussion of sovereignty in a strongly nationalist direction. Justice James
Wilson launched a frontal assault on the very use of sovereignty language
251. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
252. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419 (argument of counsel).
253. Id at 423 (argument of counsel).
254. Id. (argument of counsel).
255. Id (argument of counsel).
256. As Justice James Iredell intimated in his dissent, this strategy was not without its
problems. Randolph had no clear answer to the assertion that the words of Article III could
only be read properly against the background of legal history and political assumptions shared
by Americans in 1787-88. By recognizing a state's right to sue as plaintiff in federal court,
Justice Iredell insisted, "every word in the Constitution" could be given effect without offend-
ing the widespread assumption during the ratification process that the states would retain their
sovereign immunity from compulsory suit. Id. at 429, 449-50 (Iredell, J.).
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at all in American political discussion. No intellectual or rhetorical con-
fusion had done "mischief so extensive or so practically pernicious... in
politics and jurisprudence," in Justice Wilson's view, as the words
"states" and "sovereigns." '257 Justice Wilson pointed out that the termi-
nology of "sovereignty" was wholly absent from the Constitution's text,
and not surprisingly so, since only the people of the nation as a whole
could properly assume the title of "sovereign" in a government of free-
dom and equal rights.25 Talk of a "sovereign" was simply inapposite
and misleading in America where there were no "subjects." In particu-
lar, a state such as Georgia had no claim to be called or treated as "sover-
eign." It was not "sovereign" in the sense of the law of nations because it
was bound by the Constitution and thus did not govern itself "without
any dependence on another power"; 259 nor was it "sovereign" in terms of
republican theory, for the "citizens of Georgia, as a part of the 'People of
the United States'" had not surrendered "the supreme or sovereign
power to that state; but, as to the purposes of the union, retained it to
themselves." 2" Having disposed of the entire notion of state sovereignty,
Justice Wilson had no need to deal with the argument that the Constitu-
tion presumed or preserved state sovereign immunity.
Chief Justice John Jay reached Justice Wilson's (and Randolph's)
conclusion by yet another, and in Chief Justice Jay's case, historical
route. During the colonial period, Chief Justice Jay wrote, the crown
was the sovereign, and the American colonists were fellow-subjects of
one another and of the inhabitants of Great Britain. When the colonies
as a united group declared themselves independent, "the sovereignty of
the country passed to the people of it," the American people as a
whole.26' The vicissitudes of war and political confusion, along with "lo-
cal convenience and considerations," misled Americans into reconceiving
the nation as a "confederation" of "thirteen sovereignties." '262 The fail-
ure of the Articles of Confederation, however, reawakened the American
people to "their collective and national capacity," and in that capacity
the people "executed their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty"
to establish the Constitution.263 Thus the language of state sovereignty
was an historical error,2 4 subsequently corrected, and compulsory fed-
257. Id. at 453, 454 (Wilson, J.).
258. Id. (Wilson, J.).
259. Id. at 457 (Wilson, J.).
260. Id. (Wilson, J.).
261. Id. at 469 (Jay, C.J.).
262. Id. at 470 (Jay, CJ.).
263. Id. at 471 (Jay, C.J.).
264. Chief Justice Jay did refer to the state's "residuary sovereignty," but the context sug-
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eral jurisdiction over state-defendants "brings into action, and enforces
this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this
country.
2 65
On a political level, the attempts of Justice Wilson and Chief Justice
Jay to claim "sovereignty" for the nation, or to banish the term alto-
gether, ran afoul of the clamor aroused by the possibility of federal judg-
ments being enforced against debt-ridden states such as Georgia. The
Eleventh Amendment swiftly overturned the specific holding of
Chisholm v. Georgia, and the "Revolution of 1800' 266 rendered ultra-
nationalist views politically unacceptable. On the other hand, Wilson
and Jay had identified correctly the importance of debate over sover-
eignty, and over the proper recounting of constitutional history in Amer-
ican constitutional argument. Their outright rejection of state
sovereignty and Jay's historical picture of a national "people" which pre-
ceded the post-independence state polities were minority views (espe-
cially after 1800), but in more subtle forms their positions influenced the
jurisprudence of the Marshall Court and the Republican nationalism of
the late 1810s.267
C. The States as Sovereign Parties to the Constitution
The states' status as sovereigns, contested by Wilson and Jay but
generally admitted rhetorically by both nationalists and their opponents
in the 1790s, became a central constitutional concept in the theory (or
theories) propounded by Republican leaders during the 1798-1800 cri-
sis.268 In a series of widely publicized public papers-Pennsylvania Chief
Justice M'Kean's opinion in Respublica v. Cobbett,269 the Kentucky Res-
olutions of 1798 and 1799, the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, and the Vir-
ginia Report of 180027°--the Republicans sketched an anti-nationalist
constitutional vision that regarded state sovereignty as the fundamental
political datum in the constitutional order. The electoral "Revolution of
1800," which permanently ousted the Federalists from national political
gests that he was referring to "sovereignty" in the old sense of sovereignty as "the right to
govern." Id. at 470 (Jay, C.J.).
265. Id. at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
266. On the Republican understanding of their victory in the federal elections of 1800 as a
true "revolution," see DANIEL SISSON, THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION OF 1800 (1974).
267. The great nationalist Republican jurist of the next generation, Joseph Story, relied
extensively on Jay's historical argument in his identification of the nation as the true sovereign
under the Constitution. See H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1303-04 (1985).
268. See supra notes 69 & 72.
269. 3 Dall. 467, 475 (Pa. 1798); see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 71-76, and 177-79, and accompanying text.
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power, and the dissemination of the "principles of '98" through such
influential channels as St. George Tucker's 1803 edition of Blackstone,
insured that federal constitutional argument after 1800 would have, as
explicit subject or implicit backdrop, a complex of concepts and ques-
tions surrounding the notion of the states as sovereigns.27
The second and third articles of the Articles of Confederation de-
fined the fundamental nature of the confederacy that the Articles were
establishing, and enunciated a fundamental interpretive principle flowing
from that nature. The second article stated that "[e]ach state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence," '272 and the third that the
"states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship. 27 3 The
second article concluded that as a consequence each state retained "every
Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by this confederation ex-
pressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."274 The
heart of the "principles of '98" was the claim that these concepts-the
states as original sovereigns; the Union as a league or compact created by
a written, quasi-contractual agreement; the interpretive obligation of
reading the compact's delegation of authority to the federal government
narrowly, in strict accord with the compact's text and the states' intent-
were applicable as well to the 1787 Constitution and should govern its
interpretation. As Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice M'Kean
wrote, before the Constitution's adoption, "the several states had abso-
lute and unlimited sovereignty within their respective boundaries.
2 7
When these sovereigns replaced the Articles' "league of friendship," Jef-
ferson wrote, they did so "by compact, .... constitut[ing] a general govern-
ment for special purposes, delegat[ing] to that government certain
definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right
to their own self-government., 276 As a consequence, Madison asserted,
271. There are, of course, other interpretations of the "principles of '98" and their role in
constitutional history. In his superb lectures on Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the
Slaveholding South, Don E. Fehrenbacher, while agreeing with the states-rights interpretation
put forward here, disputes their long-term importance. According to Professor Fehrenbacher,
"[s]ubsequent use of the Resolutions in the sectional conflict has inflated and distorted their
contemporary significance." Don E. Fehrenbacher, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH 42 (1989). In a famous article, Adrienne Koch and Henry
Amman accepted the historical importance of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions while
interpreting them as primarily concerned with the Federalist threat to individual constitutional
rights and especially to freedom of speech and press. Adrienne Koch & Henry Amman, The
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil
Liberties, 5 WM & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 145 (1948).
272. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. Il (1781).
273. Id. art. III.
274. Id. art. II.
275. Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Dall. 467, 473 (Pa. 1798).
276. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, supra note 178, at 540.
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the federal government's powers "result[ed] from the compact" and were
"limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting
that compact.., no further valid than they are authorized by the grants
enumerated in that compact." '277
Jefferson and Madison were not wholly in agreement, and their disa-
greement exemplified a deep uncertainty running through state sover-
eignty constitutionalism. Jefferson's 1798 Kentucky Resolutions
conceived of the constitutional compact as an agreement between "each
state... as a state and... an integral party, its co-states forming as to
itself, the other party." '2 7 8 The resulting image of a series of two-party
compacts is conceptually confusing, but yielded a conclusion Jefferson
apparently welcomed, that each individual state had "an equal right to
judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of re-
dress."2 79 Madison, in contrast, consistently referred to "the states" in
the plural as the "sovereign parties to their constitutional compact"28
and seems to have seen the states' check on the federal government as
essentially political in character. Madison's understanding of the com-
pact theory thus did not differ greatly from the nationalist position in
practical terms:281 The Report of 1800 expressly defined the "states" that
are constitutional parties and sovereigns as "the people composing those
political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity," rather than as any
ordinary state organ.282
This vision of the Constitution as a compact among sovereigns-the
Pennsylvania legislature in 1811 described it as "to all intents and pur-
poses a treaty between sovereign states"283-played an important and ul-
timately tragic role in future constitutional history as the justification for
state defiance of federal authority, for state interference with federal ac-
tivity, and for secession and civil war. In the founding era, its primary
function was to provide a conceptual basis on which to rest a narrow
construction of the Constitution's grants of power to the federal govern-
ment. As a matter of political and international law, St. George Tucker
wrote in 1803, "[S]everal sovereign and independent states may unite
277. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 308.
278. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, supra note 178, at 540.
279. Id.
280. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 308-10, 348.
281. Few Americans of any political persuasion would have disagreed with Roger Sher-
man's 1787 observation that federal statutes could not "be enforced contrary to the Sense of a
majority of the States." Letter to Unknown Addressee (Dec. 8, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 387 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saldino eds., 1983) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
282. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 309.
283. Pennsylvania Resolutions of 1811, in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 173, at 53.
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themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without each ceasing to
be a perfect state";284 such "a federal compact, or alliance between...
states," customarily was reduced to writing,2"5 which in turn was "to be
construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of states may
be drawn in question."2 6
The state compact and strict construction themes of the "principles
of '98" were a constant feature of constitutional discourse after 1800.
They provided the language for constitutional opposition, invoked by
New England Federalists against President Jefferson's embargo and Pres-
ident Madison's war, as well as by Pennsylvania Republicans against the
bank bill renewal and by Virginia Republicans against Supreme Court
jurisdiction. But these concepts were not without influence on those sup-
porting expansive readings of federal power. After 1800 the latter almost
invariably couched their constitutional views in terms of' close textual
exegesis rather than of grand pronouncements about the federal govern-
ment's undefined "resulting powers" or sovereignty of choice. Justice
Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,2" 7 for example, squarely re-
jected the 1798 "principle" that the states as sovereignties established the
Constitution and adopted instead an ultra-nationalist ascription of the
Constitution's creation to "the people of the United States."2 8 Story
upheld a statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, however,
by a rigorous parsing of Article III's text entirely in the 1798 textualist
tradition.
The Republican nationalist justifications of their expansive federal
legislative program of the post-War of 1812 period were similar blends of
'98 principle and Hamiltonian substance. In 1817, for example, Calhoun
accepted "the position" that "our Constitution was founded on positive
and written principles," 28 9 and he defended an internal improvements
bill by a careful examination of the language of Article I, section 8. Clay
began an 1818 speech with the statement that "he had imbibed his con-
stitutional opinions which had influenced his political course" from the
Report of 1800 and other documents "of analogous principles"; 291 Clay
284. Tucker, supra note 49, at 141.
285. Id. at 153.
286. While founding-era Americans usually employed the language of compact and strict
construction in addressing federalism issues, Republican constitutionalists occasionally used
the concepts to support a more general libertarian presumption against the existence of govern-
mental power on any level. See Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, supra note 178, at 161-62
(expressing Republican "attachment to limited government, whether general or particular").
287. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323-82 (1816).
288. Id. at 324.
289. Calhoun, supra note 126, at 404.
290. Clay, supra note 52, at 448.
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went on to assert the legitimacy "in all that relates essentially to the pres-
ervation of this Union" of giving federal powers "a liberal construc-
tion." '291 Jefferson sadly acknowledged to Albert Gallatin in 1817 that
"almost the only landmark which now divides the federalists [among
whom Jefferson classed many Republican nationalists] from the republi-
cans" was the debate over how to read-indeed almost over how to
punctuate-the beginning of Article I, section 8.292 The great 1790s de-
bate over the locus of sovereignty had as its most immediate result the
reenforcement of textual argument as the primary vehicle of constitu-
tional discourse.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION
In his great Dictionary, published in 1755, Dr. Samuel Johnson iden-
tified two distinct sets of meanings for the word "discretion." For the
first definition of "discretion," he listed "Prudence; knowledge to govern
or direct one's self, skill; wise management." Among the examples John-
son gave were two that linked "wisdom and discretion," and one, a quo-
tation from Pope's Essay on Criticism, that used "discretion" to refer to
care or skill in the writing of poetry. Johnson's second set of definitions
was unaccompanied by examples from literature, as he himself provided
one: "Liberty of acting at pleasure; uncontrolled, and unconditional
power; as, he surrenders at discretion; that is without stipulation." '293
"Discretion" was an important and extremely controversial concept
in early American constitutional discourse; much of the trouble stemmed
from the fact that for Americans of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, the word retained both complexes of meaning Dr. John-
son had recognized. Many, perhaps most, of the major constitutional
disputes of the period involved a claim by someone to the legitimate exer-
cise of discretion in the sense of wisdom, skill, or knowledge, and a re-
joinder by others that this was in fact a claim to the unconstitutional and
oppressive possession of discretion in the form of uncontrolled power.
Debate over the role and legitimacy of "discretion" in the American con-
stitutional order played a significant part in discussions of the extent of
congressional power, the scope of judicial review, the relationship be-
tween the executive and the judiciary, and the sanctity of vested rights;
all three branches of government under the American constitutions de-
291. Id. at 449.
292. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, supra note 163, at 133.
293. For a modem reader, Johnson's example may obscure as much as it clarifies. To
"stipulate" meant in Johnson's time "to bargain" or "to settle terms." Thus, where Johnson
wrote "he surrenders at discretion," we might say something like "he surrenders without nego-
tiating any terms and thus is at the mercy of his enemy's will."
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fined themselves in part on the basis of what form of discretion they legit-
imately could exercise.
294
The underlying political grammar of early American constitutional-
ism was structured around the search for a means of empowering govern-
ment and the opposite need to control government in the interests of the
people's welfare and liberty. Without some means of control, Americans
would be no safer from their own governments than they had been from
the King and Parliament. An excess of control, on the other hand,
would "paralyze the powers of the Constitution"2 95 and thus render the
American experiment in republican government self-defeating. Everyone
agreed with Hamilton that "no government has a right to do merely what
itpleases,"296 but in one way or another almost everyone also agreed with
his cynical observation that "in politics, power, and right are
equivalent,"'2 97 at least as a statement of the tendency of power to claim
legitimacy. The very point of written constitutions was to deny the auto-
matic equation of power with right and thereby to put a check on
power's tendency toward oppression. "[I]t is jealousy, -ad not confi-
dence, which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down those whom
we are obliged to trust with power," Jefferson wrote in 1798, adding that
"our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no fur-
ther, our confidence [in our governors] may go."'298 Hamilton himself
wrote that to recognize "unlimited discretion" in Congress would be to
"destroy the very idea of a Constitution limiting its discretion. The Con-
stitution would at once vanish!"299 Boundless executive discretion was, if
possible, even less acceptable: As Justice Johnson wrote, "The officers of
our government, from the highest to the lowest, are equally subjected to
legal restraint." 3"
A. The Discretion of the Legislature
The most important and controversial questions about "discretion"
concerned its exercise by legislatures and, especially, by Congress. The
activity of legislation clearly involved "discretion" in Dr. Johnson's first
294. Professor G. Edward white's magisterial study of the later Marshall Court is the
essential starting point for anyone interested in early nineteenth century notions of "discre-
tion." See WHrrE, supra note 7, at 195-200.
295. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1222 (1798) (speech of James A. Bayard).
296. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 103.
297. Id. at 123.
298. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, supra note 178, at 161.
299. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Loughton Smith (Mar. 10, 1796), in 20
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 40, at 72-73.
300. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No.
5,420).
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sense of "prudence" or "wise management. 3 0 1 The Constitution gave
powers to Congress, Madison told the House of Representatives in 1796,
on the presumption that "the legislature would exercise its authority with
discretion, allowing due weight" to considerations of policy, expediency,
and circumstance;3°2 the power to engage in a degree of "deliberation
and discretion" was "essential to the nature of legislative power. '30 3 The
"political discretion" of Congress, Judge John Davis wrote in 1808, "em-
braces, combines and considers, all circumstances, events and projects,
foreign or domestick, that can affect the national interests.
' 3°4
Legislators engaged in making choices about the exercise of "the
authority delegated to them," according to Justice Iredell, "exercise the
discretion vested in them by the people. '30 5  Republicans such as
Madison usually differed with Federalists, like Hamilton, Davis, and Ire-
dell, over the relationship of congressional discretion to the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. The generality-and thus the ambiguity-of
the Constitution's language was frequently discussed during the ratifica-
tion process. A newspaper in late 1787 expressed the standard argument
of the Constitution's supporters: The proposed Constitution defined fed-
eral powers "as minutely as may be, in their principle; and any detail of
them which may become necessary, is committed to the wisdom of Con-
gress. '3 6 It was precisely this implicit reliance on congressional discre-
tion that disturbed opponents of the Constitution: "There is some
ambiguity in several important parts of it, which arises principally from
ye too general terms in which it is expressed. Too much perhaps is left
for ye future Congress to supply, which when supplied will be no part of
ye Constitution.
'30 7
After ratification, nationalists usually stressed the need for Congress
to exercise wise judgment both in interpreting the Constitution and in
selecting the most appropriate means to carry out its constitutional re-
sponsibilities. As Ames reminded the House in 1791, few pieces of legis-
lation literally tracked the language of Article I which grants Congress
power; as a consequence, in virtually all its law-making Congress was
obliged to exercise "our discretion with regard to the true intent of the
301. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
302. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1796).
303. Id.
304. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
305. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).
306. A Citizen of Philadelphia, The Weakness of Brutus Exposed (Nov. 8, 1787), in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 281, at 66.
307. Letter from William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), in 14 Docu
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 281, at 116.
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Constitution. '3 8 He explained that "[tihe Constitution contains the
principles which are to govern in making laws," but that in applying
these constitutional principles to specific legislative concerns, the Con-
gress was "to exercise our judgments, and on every occasion to decide
according to an honest conviction of its true meaning. '"309 "The bounda-
ries of the Constitution cannot be laid down with mathematical preci-
sion, by the square and compass," Henry St. George Tucker argued in
1818, "[t]hey must be ascertained by the principles of sound reason and
common sense, and by the exercise of a just discretion. ' 310 The Consti-
tution thus was to be regarded as "a rule of conduct for the legislative
body" rather than a list of exactly what Congress could and could not
do.311 The needs of the nation "are of such infinite variety, extent and
complexity," Hamilton wrote, that Congress must enjoy "of necessity...
great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of [the]
means" of meeting those needs.31 2 He admitted the possibility of "con-
troversy and difference of opinion" over the constitutionality of Con-
gress' choices, but contended that "a reasonable latitude and judgment"
on the constitutional question "must be allowed" to Congress.31 3
According Congress discretion in the interpretation and application
of the Constitution, nationalists argued, did not entail permitting it to
"govern by its own arbitrary discretion"; 314 the discretion they were en-
dorsing was Dr. Johnson's "prudence" ("wisdom applied to practice")
rather than his "uncontrolled power." Congress itself was capable of de-
termining what means of carrying out its tasks were appropriately related
to the Constitution's ends and appropriately respectful of the rights of
individuals and states. The nationalists admitted that "there must al-
ways be great difference of opinion, as to the 'direct relationship', and
'real necessity' of the accessary powers" selected,315 but insisted that this
fact did not mean that Congress' choices were arbitrary. "No, sir,"
Tucker told his congressional colleagues, "it is not a mathematical, it is a
moral certainty, that we are to expect in these great questions of political
right .... Constitutional powers, which admit not of precise definition,"
were, he added, "to be referred to practical good sense and sound discre-
308. Ames, supra note 37, at 854.
309. Id.
310. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 633 (1818).
311. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 459 (1818).
312. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 105.
313. Id. at 107.
314. Id. at 153.
315. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1325 (1818).
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tion."31 6 Nationalists stressed this "internal" check of rational argument
on congressional arbitrariness; they also invoked "representative respon-
sibility"3 7 and judicial review318 as "external" checks on legislative
waywardness.
The early opponents of expansive readings of federal power are often
viewed as motivated primarily by a general fear of centralized power.
Although that concern undeniably fueled the development of opposition
thought and its crystallization in the "principles of '98," the fear of dis-
cretion was at least as important a factor. Opposition constitutionalists
of the 1790s by and large doubted that the activity of prudential reason-
ing could be distinguished from the exercise of arbitrary choice; as a con-
sequence they did not believe that an "internal" check on Congress'
powers could exist once the legislature abandoned a strict observance of
its "chartered authorities."319 "To take a single step beyond the bounda-
ries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take pos-
session of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any
definition.
320
The nationalists' claim that according to their interpretation of its
powers Congress was constrained by its obligation to pursue the Consti-
tution's designated ends, and especially "the general welfare" named in
Article I, section 8, was, Jefferson wrote, empty.321 It amounted to a
reduction of "the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting
a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the
United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it
would be also a power to do whatever evil they please. ' 322 "[T]he Con-
stitution of the United States is not.., a mere general designation of the
ends or objects for which the Federal Government was established," Pe-
ter Porter told the House of Representatives in 1811, "leaving to Con-
gress a discretion as to the means or powers by which those ends shall be
brought about."3 23 The Constitution was equally "a specification of the
powers or means themselves" by which its ends were to be achieved. 24
"The powers of the Constitution, carried into execution according to the
strict terms and import of them, are the appropriate means, and the only
316. Id.
317. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 459 (1817) (House committee report on Internal
Improvements).
318. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 36, 38 (1802) (speech of Gouverneur Morris, Jan. 8, 1802).
319. Madison, supra note 33, at 416.
320. Bank Opinion, supra note 35, at 416.
321. Id
322. Id. at 418.




means within the reach of this Government, for the attainment of its
ends." '325 Opponents of expansive federal power, such as Madison, who
accepted the unavoidability of legislative interpretation hoped to resolve
debatable questions of construction through careful exegesis of the text
and then to control Congress by demanding adherence to precedent.326
The intellectual struggle between advocates and opponents of con-
gressional discretion in applying the Constitution was waged in large part
over the proper reading of two clauses of Article I, section 8: the ambig-
uous language about the "general welfare" at the beginning of the sec-
tion,327 and the Necessary and Proper Clause at its conclusion. The
"general welfare" language was susceptible to at least three different in-
terpretations. The most nationalist and least widespread view construed
the clause to grant Congress three separate and distinct powers-the
power to collect taxes, to pay debts, and to "provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States. '3 28 Alexander Addi-
son's critique of the Report of 1800 adopted this position. The Constitu-
tion, according to Addison, "gives to Congress power over the means,
and imposes the duty of providing for the general welfare in all cases
whatever, to which in its discretion the means ought to be applied.2
329
Critics of this view, such as Jefferson, regarded this as a claim of "univer-
sal power" based on a mere grammatical quibble,330 and most national-
ists also rejected it as inconsistent with section eight's evident attempt to
enumerate Congress' powers.33'
Most nationalists, and all of their opponents, agreed that the phrase
"provide for the common defense and general welfare" modified Con-
gress' power to raise money and spend it. The debate then became one
over whether Congress could spend the revenues it raised on any object
that seemed to it to benefit the nation's defense or welfare, or rather was
restricted to expenditures connected with the powers subsequently enu-
325. Id.
326. Madison noted early in the First Congress that "[a]mong other difficulties, the exposi-
tion of the Constitution is frequently a copious source, and must continue so until its meaning
on all great points shall have been settled by precedents." Letter from James Madison to
Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 22, at 250; see also Letter
from Madison to Ingersoll, supra note 121, at 390-93 (discussing the "necessity of regarding a
course of practice" as fixing the meaning of the Constitution).
327. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
328. Id
329. Addison, supra note 184, at 1066.
330. Bank Opinion, supra note 35, at 418-19.
331. See, eg., Calhoun's famous speech defending the constitutionality of the 1817 internal
improvements bill that Madison subsequently vetoed. Calhoun, supra note 126, at 398-409.
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merated in the section. Hamiltonian Federalists in the 1790s and many
Republican nationalists of the period following the War of 1812 main-
tained the former position. As Calhoun explained in 1817, "First-the
power is given to lay taxes; next, the objects are enumerated to which the
money accruing from the exercise of this power may be applied-to pay
the debts, provide for the common defence, and promote the general wel-
fare."'332 He rejected a limitation of the spending power to the other
powers listed in the section as inconsistent with the constitutional text:
"If the framers had intended to limit the use of the money to the powers
afterwards enumerated and defined, nothing could be more easy than to
have expressed it plainly. ' 333 The scope of Congress' spending power
thus involved not a question of constitutional interpretation but of polit-
ical policy. So long as Congress did not attempt to appropriate money
for a "purpose merely or purely local," Hamilton wrote, the question of
"how far it will really promote or not the welfare of the union, must be a
matter of conscientious discretion" and not of "constitutional right.
'334
Critics of the usual nationalist interpretation position argued that its
pragmatic effect would be identical to that of the ultra-nationalist claim
that there was a substantive "general welfare" power. The latter gave
Congress "a general power of legislation instead of the defined and lim-
ited one hitherto understood to belong to them," Madison wrote in
1817. 331 "A restriction of the power 'to provide for the common defense
and general welfare' to cases which are to be provided for by the expendi-
ture of money" was no better; it "would still leave within the legislative
power of Congress all the great and most important measures of Govern-
ment, money being the ordinary and necessary means of carrying them
into execution. 336 Madison and those who shared his view of the "gen-
eral welfare" phrase rejected such a result as textually unacceptable,
since it would "rende[r] the special and careful enumeration of powers
which follow the clause nugatory and improper. ' a33 Equally unaccept-
able was the vast expansion of federal governmental discretion that
would result. A Congress empowered to spend money in all matters in-
volving the general welfare, Madison argued in his Report of 1800, would
be too busy to give careful attention to all "the objects of legislative
care," as well as unable to adapt its legislation properly to "the diversity
332. Id. at 403.
333. Id.
334. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 129.
335. 8 THE WRINGS OF JAMES MADISON 387 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
336. Id. at 387.
337. Id. at 87.
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of particular situations. ' 338 "One consequence must be, to enlarge the
sphere of discretion allowed to the executive magistrate," thus raising the
spectre of a president wielding quasi-royal "prerogative and pa-
tronage. 3 39 Madison's message vetoing the 1817 Bonus Bill" added to
this an argument concerning judicial review, which he asserted would be
unavailable to restrain congressional misuses of a "general welfare"
power or an enlarged spending power "inasmuch as questions relating to
the general welfare, being questions of policy and expediency, are unsus-
ceptible of judicial cognizance and decision."' 341 To avoid such unaccept-
able results, Alexander Smythe told the House the following year, the
phrase had to be construed to limit Congress to "expending the money
raised in the execution of the other powers expressly granted."342
In their attack on the original bank bil, 34 3 Madison and Jefferson
crafted what became the standard non-nationalist interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The clause authorized Congress to exer-
cise a power not expressly given, according to Madison, only if it was
"evidently and necessarily involved in an express power. 34 Any other
argument would construe the clause to give Congress "an unlimited dis-
cretion," a conclusion that would undercut "the essential characteristic
of the government"-its limited nature.345 Jefferson was even more em-
phatic, writing that the Constitution legitimized only "those means with-
out which the grant of power would be nugatory., 346 This stringent
reading of the clause reappeared in the 1811 bank renewal debate: 34 7
Representative Porter, for example, insisted that the clause "gives no lati-
tude of discretion on the selection of means or powers. ' 348 "If you un-
dertake to justify a law" as necessary and proper to the execution of an
enumerated power, Porter maintained, "you must show the incidentality
and applicability of the law to the power itself, and not merely its relation
to any supposed end which is to be accomplished by its exercise[;] ... the
plain, direct, ostensible, primary object and tendency of your law [must
be] to execute the [enumerated] power.
'349
338. Report of 1800, supra note 71, at 316.
339. Id.
340. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
341. Madison, supra note 29, at 585.
342. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1146 (1818).
343. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
344. Madison, supra note 33, at 378.
345. Id at 376.
346. Bank Opinion, supra note 35, at 41.
347. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
348. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 636 (1811).
349. Id
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Nationalists attacked this strict reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as implausible. According to Hamilton, "neither the grammati-
cal, nor popular sense of the term requires that construction. According
to both, necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, inciden-
tal, useful, or conducive to."350 The "whole turn of the clause"-with its
references to "all laws," "all other powers," "any department or officer,"
and so on-indicated, Hamilton argued, that "it was the intent of the
convention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the
specified powers." '51 The Necessary and Proper Clause in fact was an
explicit authorization of Congress' "great latitude of discretion in the se-
lection and application of those means." '352 Later nationalists reiterated
Hamilton's analysis. Marshall's 1805 opinion in United States v.
Fisher,35 a for example, rejected a Jeffersonian strict necessity construc-
tion as an interpretive nightmare, since it would always be possible to
argue that any given means could be replaced by a different one.35 4 In-
stead, "Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empow-
ered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a
power granted by the constitution." '
B. Presidential Discretion and the Rule of Law
The problem of discretion was not confined to the legislative sphere.
Indeed, the most persistent constitutional issue during Jefferson's presi-
dency probably was the struggle between the administration and the fed-
eral courts over the nature and limits of executive discretion. Even
though a central Republican theme in the 1790s was opposition to the
Federalist ideal of a strong executive, after the Republican electoral vic-
tory of 1800, Republican President Jefferson was a staunch defender of
presidential discretion to interpret the Constitution and to act on his in-
terpretation,35 6 to govern the executive's conduct by its own view of the
law notwithstanding contrary judicial opinion,35 7 to make independent
judgments about issues of special executive concern such as foreign af-
fairs and national security,358 and to resist judicial attempts to "direct the
350. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 102.
351. Id at 102-03 (emphasis added).
352. Id. at 105.
353. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
354. Id. at 396.
355. Id.
356. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, supra note 36, at 279.
357. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 12, 1807), in 9 JEFFERSON WRIT-
INGS, supra note 36, at 53-54.
358. d at 56.
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use to be made" of executive power.3 59
The response of the federal courts was to recognize the existence of
the President's "political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
own discretion," but to insist that the courts, not the President, were the
final judges of the limits of those powers. Marshall's opinion in Marbury
conceded that "in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional
or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their
acts are only politically examinable. '"3 ° But where the law assigned a
duty to the executive, or there was a question of constitutional right, the
President's actions were subject to judicial examination. The President
"cannot, at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others," Mar-
shall wrote, adding that a claim of vested right "must be tried by the
judicial authority. 3 61 Presidential invasion of such a right would entitle
the injured party to a remedy even if that entailed subjecthig a high exec-
utive officer to a peremptory judicial writ. Nor did the President enjoy
discretion about whether to enforce the laws. "If he could," Justice Pat-
erson observed, "it would render the execution of the laws dependent on
his will and pleasure; which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and
will not meet with any supporters in our government.
'362
Jefferson's claim to independent interpretive authority was flatly de-
nied by both Federalist and Republican judges. Marshall's famous state-
ment that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is"' 363 was directed against the preten-
sions of the legislature, but he and his colleagues were equally ready to
apply it to the executive. Justice Johnson forcefully stated their position
in his newspaper defense of his decision in Gilchrist v. Collector of
Charleston:3s6  "Of these laws [the 'laws of the United States'] the courts
are the constitutional expositors; and every department of government
must submit to their exposition; for laws have no legal meaning but what
is given them by the courts to whose exposition they are submitted. "
365
359. Letter from Caesar Rodney to Thomas Jefferson (July 15, 1808), in 1 THE GROWTH
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, supra note 198, at 558-61. The letter, addressed to the President
by his attorney general and "leaked" to the press, was obviously a statement of the official
views of the Jefferson administration.
360. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
361. Id at 167.
362. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
363. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
364. 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5,420). In Gilchrist, Justice Johnson held for
the circuit court that presidential instructions interpreting and applying a federal embargo act
were unwarranted under the statute and if intended to be mandatory were an inadvertent but
"unsanctioned encroachment upon individual liberty." Id. at 356. He therefore issued a writ
of mandamus ordering the collector of the port of Charleston to disregard the instructions.
365. Johnson, supra note 198, at 568-69.
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The replacement of Jefferson by Madison as President eased relations
between the executive and the judiciary, in large part because Madison
quickly receded from Jefferson's more militant positions. While Madison
did not hesitate on a number of occasions to veto a bill because he dis-
agreed with Congress about its constitutionality, from early on in his
administration he denied that any "legal discretion lies with the Execu-
tive of the U[nited] States" to interfere with judicial decisions or interpre-
tations of law.a66
C. The Legal Discretion of the Courts
Americans of the founding era frequently stated that courts, too,
exercised discretion, but in those cases the usage usually belonged in Dr.
Johnson's first set of definitions which referred to prudence, skill, and
knowledge.3 67 In exercising its proper form of discretion, a court was not
to choose arbitrarily but in accordance with the rules of law. When
United States District Attorney George Hay argued to the circuit court
during the treason prosecution of Aaron Burr that the court could choose
not to grant Burr's motion for a subpoena duces tecum to the President,
Chief Justice Marshall replied that Hay misunderstood judicial discre-
tion: "This is said to be a motion to the discretion of the court. This is
true. But a motion to its discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but
to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal princi-
ples. ' 368 The court's discretion was to be exercised in determining the
legal relevance of the documents sought by the subpoena, and the legal
cogency of any claim by the executive that the national interests required
the document's exclusion from evidence, but "the court has no right to
refuse its aid to motions for papers to which the accused may be entitled"
by legal principle.369
"Discretion" in the judicial context thus had little to do with choice;
it was, rather, the court's skillful exercise of judgment in discerning and
applying correctly the rules of law. "Courts are the mere instruments of
the law, and can will nothing," Marshall wrote in 1824. "When they are
said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to
be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law."' 370 Legal discre-
tion, the process of determining the correct application of given princi-
366. Letter from James Madison to Simon Snyder (Apr. 13, 1809), supra note 213, at 114.
367. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
368. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). In the
motion, Burr sought to compel President Jefferson to produce various documents relating to
the military's efforts to arrest him.
369. Id.
370. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
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ples to specific cases, thus had little in common with the political
discretion of a legislature or an executive magistrate, even when the term
was ascribed to either in a positive sense. As Judge Davis explained,
"Legal discretion is limited. It is thus defined by [L]ord Coke, 'Discre-
tion is to discern, by means of law, what is just.' Political discretion has
a far wider range. It embraces, combines and considers, all circum-
stances, events and projects, foreign or domestick, that can affect the na-
tional interests."37' Judicial discretion could only play a role in
questions where the applicable principles of decision permitted "preci-
sion and certainty, 3 72 but it is of the very essence of political discretion
that it is exercised in conditions of uncertainty and with regard to consid-
erations of expediency and necessity.
Despite the obvious fact that not all judicial decisions, and particu-
larly those involving constitutional matters, were uncontroversial, legal
discretion and politics were usually differentiated sharply. The Constitu-
tion, Marshall insisted in 1800, "had never been understood, to confer on
[the judiciary] any political power whatever," but only the authority to
resolve specific questions that could take "a legal form" and thus be de-
cided by legal rules.373 Judicial discretion thus involved "the exercise of
a rational Judgment," in Kent's words, rather than "arbitrary will."374
Judicial interpretation of a constitution, with all its political ramifica-
tions, was no less "legal" in nature than statutory construction or com-
mon-law reasoning. Constitutional interpretation, like all legal
interpretation, rested on demonstrable principles, which St. George
Tucker asserted "can be ascertained from the living letter, not from ob-
scure reasoning or deductions only. '3 75 While there certainly were crit-
ics of specific constitutional decisions throughout this period, their
complaint seldom if ever was directed against the assertion that courts
must wield (legal) discretion in determining and applying the law. The
intense warfare waged against the Federalist judges in the first years of
Jefferson's presidency did not involve, for the most part, any rejection of
judicial power, only of its unworthy possessors. There was no paradox in
the fact that the most prominent Jeffersonian jurist of the 18 10s, Spencer
Roane, held a very high view of judicial authority. When he attacked the
Federal Supreme Court's claim of jurisdiction to review state court deci-
371. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700)
(translation of Coke's Latin supplied).
372. IA
373. John Marshall, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (March 7, 1800), in 4
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 95-96 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984).
374. Kent, supra note 27, at 943.
375. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 78 (Gen. Ct. 1793) (Tucker, J.).
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sions, his criticism was that the Court had abused its discretion by apply-
ing the wrong legal principles, not that judicial discretion was itself
illegitimate or indistinguishable from political choice.
V. CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A POLITICAL GRAMMAR
Viewed from the perspective of specific political issues, the founding
era appears to have been a time of remarkably widespread constitutional
dissension. The Philadelphia convention itself was far from harmonious,
and the struggle over ratification revealed deep disagreements over polit-
ical structure, civic virtue, and the proper relationship of power to lib-
erty. Before the First Congress adjourned, the victorious Federalists
(supporters of ratification) had split irreversibly into two political alli-
ances, bitterly divided over constitutional issues. Beginning with the
1791 bank debate, federal constitutional discussion operated within a
framework of systemic disagreement.376 State constitutionalism was also
the locus of serious conf ict.
377
The founding era's very real battles over substantive constitutional
questions, however, were articulated-indeed, were made possible-by
the emergence of a common set of ideas, problems, and structures of
argument. Contemporary American constitutional debate is shaped
more by our continued use of that "political grammar" (greatly modified
over the years, of course) than by continuity with the particular moral
and political concerns of the founding era. Much heated debate in con-
temporary constitutional theory stems from the fact that the modem the-
orists are operating, sometimes unwittingly, within the eighteenth-
century dichotomy between discretion as power and discretion as the dis-
ciplined application of reason.378 The failure to recognize that American
constitutionalism is a linguistic tradition of political debate rather than a
determinate set of political outcomes fuels the continuous search for the
right constitutional theory, the theory that provides the correct resolu-
tions of constitutional disputes and thus will confer legitimacy on consti-
tutional decisions.
376. To be sure, the substantive positions of various individuals and groups sometimes
changed or even switched: The localist, state-sovereignty themes of the Republicans of 1798
were popular among the Federalists of 1815, and conversely mainstream Republican thought
was by the latter date quite close to 1790s Federalism in its approval of a vigorous federal
government.
377. See, e.g., A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS 203-
61 (1981) (discussing debate over distribution of political power in Virginia legal system be-
tween 1790 and 1810).
378. "It is part of normal experience to find our thought conditioned by assumptions and
paradigms so deep-seated that we did not know they were there until something brought them
to the surface." POCOCK, supra note 8, at 32.
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American constitutionalism, however, has never been a determinate
set of outcomes. The structures and basic concepts of constitutionalism
push in certain directions, toward an individualistic view of society, for
example, without dictating the answers to many questions likely to be
viewed as debatable in American society.37 9 Sanford Levinson has writ-
ten that "[t]here is nothing that is unsayable in the language of the Con-
stitution, even if some things will sound strange and 'off-the-wall.' 38o
Even if as a pragmatic matter this is overstated, Professor Levinson's
main point about the indeterminacy of the constitutional tradition within
which we in fact live-as opposed to the determinate constitutionalisms
of the theorists-is surely correct. Our political grammar has been and
can be employed to say and do both evil and good.
Viewed in this way, American constitutionalism does not answer the
questions of political morality and social justice that are the ultimate sub-
ject of its vocabulary and rhetorical structures; the grammar book does
not tell you what to say. In that respect, however, we are in no different
position from that of the Americans of the founding era. In arguing that
the Virginia constitution did not permit the legislature to recognize the
privileged property rights of the colonial established church, the great
Virginia jurist Spencer Roane discussed his understanding of the social
and political "effect of the revolution." Roane acknowledged "the dan-
ger of different inferences being drawn, from this source, owing to the
different media through which they pass. ' 31 To speak of the meaning of
"the reign of equal justice" that the Revolution "established in America"
takes one far afield from technical legal argument; each individual's an-
swer, Roane suggested, depends finally on ethical beliefs and commit-
ments, the depth of one's "sensibility in the cause of equal rights.
38 2
The constitutional question could not properly be posed, for Roane, if
those beliefs, commitments, and sensibilities were excluded. Like Roane
and his contemporaries, we too must go beyond the grammar of constitu-
tional debate in order to determine what meaning the Constitution is to
have.
379. At any given time, of course, many issues will not be seen as seriously contestable.
The unconstitutionality of de jure. segregation is an example of such an issue today. Forty
years ago, in contrast, the question was eminently debatable.
380. LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 191-92.
381. Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 165-66 (1804) (Roane, J.).
382. Id. at 166.
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